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Disciplining Corporate Boards and Debtholders 
Through Targeted Proxy Access 
MICHELLE M. HARNER* 
Corporate directors committed to a failed business strategy or unduly influenced by 
the company’s debtholders need a dissenting voice—they need shareholder nominees 
on the board. This Article examines the biases, conflicts, and external factors that 
impact board decisions, particularly when a company faces financial distress. It 
challenges the conventional wisdom that debt disciplines management, and it sug-
gests that, in certain circumstances, the company would benefit from having the 
shareholders’ perspective more actively represented on the board. To that end, the 
Article proposes a bylaw that would give shareholders the ability to nominate direc-
tors upon the occurrence of predefined events. Such targeted proxy access would 
incentivize boards to manage difficult operational and financial situations more pro-
actively, while creating a reasonable oversight mechanism for shareholders if those 
efforts fail. Moreover, the urgency of a company’s situation when a targeted proxy 
access provision is triggered may warrant more lenient shareholder eligibility re-
quirements, thereby more readily introducing the shareholders’ perspective into dis-
tressed situations. These refinements to traditional proxy access methodology also 
could benefit companies considering or adopting general proxy access. Neverthe-
less, the Article suggests that targeted proxy access is a more tailored solution that 
mitigates many of the concerns articulated in the proxy access debate and provides 
a better balance between management autonomy and accountability. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The corporate boardroom is not for the faint of heart. Corporate directors fre-
quently are called upon to make real time decisions involving complex financial and 
operational matters. The stakes are high, and the choices are hard. Directors are re-
quired to act in the best interests of the company, but conflicts of interest, lenders or 
investors with different agendas, or other factors may influence their judgment.1 And 
once directors have made a decision and committed to action, it is frequently difficult 
to reverse course.2  
Consider RadioShack Corp., a ninety-four-year-old company sold through a chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy case and now existing as a shell of its former self.3 Prior to the 
bankruptcy, RadioShack was slow to innovate, suffered eleven consecutive quarters 
of losses, and experienced significant turnover in key executive positions.4 Yet de-
spite these warning signs, RadioShack churned along and continued to hold onto 
hope of a turnaround. The company’s last effort to achieve that objective was fi-
nanced through a rescue loan package that ultimately led to the bankruptcy sale. 
Perhaps RadioShack was destined to fail: the victim of an all-too-familiar creative 
destruction story of an industry (i.e., brick-and-mortar electronics stores) that had 
outlived its useful life, being replaced by new, more modern forms of product deliv-
ery.5 Alternatively, perhaps internal conflict or outside influences stymied the board 
of directors, which failed to implement a creative reconstruction plan that would have 
better positioned the company for the new economy. Could a new or different per-
spective have presented better prospects of saving RadioShack? This Article suggests 
that the answer is “yes,” and it underscores the value of, and the role for, shareholder 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See infra Parts I.AI.B. 
 2. The difficulties in changing course may stem from a variety of factors, including op-
erational challenges and commitment bias on the part of the directors and management team. 
See infra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. 
 3. For a detailed case study of RadioShack, see infra Part II.D. The purchaser in the 
bankruptcy sale bought RadioShack’s trademark and 1733 of RadioShack’s more than 4000 
stores. Lisa Fickenscher, RadioShack Has a New Strategy After Its Brush with Death, N.Y. 
POST (Nov. 26, 2015, 8:19 PM), http://nypost.com/2015/11/26/radioshack-has-a-new-strategy 
-after-its-brush-with-death/ [https://perma.cc/2QU7-3CRS] (noting scope of bankruptcy sale); 
see infra Part II.D. The remaining stores were closed, causing thousands of employees to lose 
their jobs, lessors to lose rental income, and suppliers to lose a customer. See Fickenscher, 
supra. 
 4. See infra Part II.D 
 5. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 (3d ed. 1950) 
(explaining creative destruction generally as the “process of industrial mutation . . . that inces-
santly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, 
incessantly creating a new one” (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted)).  
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nominees on the board in such a situation. It further suggests the use of a well-crafted 
proxy access bylaw to implement the proposal.6 
Boards of directors do represent the interests of shareholders generally, but that 
perspective can become lost in the complex and often time-sensitive situations facing 
corporate boards, particularly in times of financial distress. A targeted proxy access 
bylaw would allow eligible shareholders to nominate candidates for the board pre-
cisely at a time when others—lenders, distressed debt investors, or special interest 
groups—may have the board’s attention.7 A more direct shareholder perspective 
could act as a counterbalance to the external, frequently biased interests represented 
by these other players, providing boards with greater leverage in negotiations and 
possibly more restructuring alternatives.  
Shareholders of public companies are increasingly using shareholder proposals to 
seek bylaws that would grant proxy access to certain categories of shareholders in all 
director elections.8 The most common proxy access proposals allow shareholders 
owning at least three percent of the company’s stock for at least three consecutive 
years to nominate a certain number of director candidates.9 The nominating share-
holder typically must make specific representations and disclosures in connection 
with the nomination, and the company must include the nominating shareholder’s 
statement in support of the nominees in its proxy materials.10 Not all companies, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. In an ordinary election proxy, the company (through its current board) identifies in-
dividuals to nominate for open board seats and includes the names of these individuals in the 
company’s proxy materials, including the company’s proxy card. Shareholders may use the 
proxy card to vote for directors in lieu of attending the annual meeting. “Proxy access refers 
to shareholders’ ability to nominate directorial candidates of their choice to the corporation’s 
proxy statement.” Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 1259, 
1260 (2009). 
 7. See infra Part II.B. 
 8. See, e.g., Keir Gumbs, Ciarra Chavarria & Tanya Kapoor, The 2015 Proxy Season: 
The Year of Proxy Access, INSIGHTS, July 2015, at 2, 2 (“For example, shareholders submitted 
only 22 proxy access proposals in 2012, 17 in 2013, and 17 again in 2014. In 2015, however, 
there has been a sharp increase in the number of proxy access shareholder proposals—as of 
July 8, 2015 at least 108 proxy access shareholder proposals have been submitted.”). The 
change in approach during the 2015 proxy season was facilitated, in part, by the City of New 
York’s Office of the Comptroller’s Boardroom Accountability Project. See N.Y.C. OFFICE OF 
THE COMPTROLLER, 2015 NEW YORK CITY PENSION FUNDS PROXY ACCESS SHAREOWNER 
PROPOSAL (2014), http://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Model-Proxy-Access.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X29N-WWZ4]. 
 9. These guidelines generally follow the proxy access rules announced by the SEC in 
2010. See infra Part III.A; see also, e.g., SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, MEMO SERIES 
THE 2015 PROXY SEASON: PROXY ACCESS PROPOSALS (2015), http://www.stblaw.com/docs 
/default-source/memos/firmmemo_07_30_15_proxy-access-proposals.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/5KD8-5A3L] (outlining the general terms of proxy access bylaws proposed to, and adopted 
by, companies); Bo Becker & Guhan Subramanian, Improving Director Elections, 3 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 33 (2013) (noting that in the context of the 2012 proxy season, “[t]he two 
successful proposals both imposed an ownership threshold/holding period requirement of 
3%/3 years, identical to the abandoned Rule 14a-11, while all of the unsuccessful proposals 
had lower thresholds, typically 1%/1 year” (emphasis in original)).  
 10. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14n-101 (2015) (setting forth Schedule 14N, which applies to 
nominations under proxy access bylaws and includes various disclosures by the nominating 
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however, are willing to adopt such bylaws; indeed, not even all shareholders support 
proxy access on such a blanket basis. 
The views on proxy access vary both in the business community and academic 
literature. For example, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) generally supports 
proxy access meeting certain criteria, including the three percent, three-year owner-
ship provisions discussed above.11 In fact, ISS released guidelines indicating that it 
may recommend a vote against directors if a board’s implementation of proxy access 
contains certain provisions that it views as problematic.12 On the other side of the 
debate, the Business Roundtable has suggested that “‘companies may have no choice 
but to consider litigation’ to keep shareholders’ proxy access proposals off their bal-
lots.”13 The voting results on proposed proxy access bylaws suggest that institutional 
shareholders tend to support such proposals more readily than retail shareholders.14 
                                                                                                                 
 
shareholder). See generally SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, PROXY ACCESS BYLAW 
DEVELOPMENT AND TRENDS (2015), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications 
/SC_Publication_Proxy_Access_Bylaw_Developments_and_Trends.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/RK33-3GSU] (providing a detailed explanation of common terms found in proxy access 
proposals). 
 11. See INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., U.S. PROXY VOTING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
(EXCLUDING COMPENSATION-RELATED): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2016), https://www 
.issgovernance.com/file/policy/us-policies-and-procedures-faq-14-march-2016.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/7F4T-A3C4]; see also Howard B. Dicker, ISS Proxy Access FAQs: Problematic 
Proxy Access Provisions, HARV. L. SCH.: F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 5, 2016), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/01/05/iss-proxy-access-faqs-problematic-proxy-access-provisions 
[https://perma.cc/PHK2-TK7B]. Another well-known proxy advisory firm, Glass Lewis, takes 
a similar position, generally supporting proxy access but scrutinizing proposals before making 
recommendations. See SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, supra note 9, at 9–10. 
 12. ISS suggests that it “may issue an adverse recommendation if a proxy access policy 
implemented or proposed by management contains material restrictions more stringent than 
those included in a majority-supported proxy access shareholder proposal with respect to the 
following . . . .” INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., supra note 11, at 19. The examples pro-
vided include ownership requirements above the three percent, three-year levels, aggregation 
limits below twenty shareholders, and restrictions on the number of directors to be nominated 
by shareholders below twenty percent of the board. Id. at 1920. 
 13. Kaja Whitehouse, Shareholders Threaten Boards over ‘Proxy Access,’ USA TODAY 
(Jan. 27, 2015, 12:43 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/01/27 
/proxyaccess-investors-businessroundtable-wholefoods/22234271/ [https://perma.cc/LQN6-32T6] 
(quoting a response letter by the Business Roundtable). 
 14. See, e.g., Press Release, Broadridge Fin. Sols., Inc., 2015 Proxy Season Results Show 
that Retail Investors Voted Against Proxy Access Proposals, According to New Report from 
Broadridge and PwC US (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.broadridge.com/news-events/press-releases 
/2015-Proxy-Season-Results-Show-that-Retail-Investors-Voted-Against-Proxy-Access-Proposals 
-According-to-New-Report-from-Broadridge-and-PwC-US.html [https://perma.cc/6Z54-VMJS] 
(“Of the over 80 proxy access proposals that came to a vote, 70% received the majority support 
of shareholders, averaging 57% of the shares voted. Retail investors voted their shares against 
proxy access in significant numbers, while institutions voted 61% of their shares in favor of 
such proposals.”). 
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Moreover, some large shareholders have adopted a case-by-case approach to 
assessing proxy access proposals.15 
Academics and other commentators acknowledge various advantages and dis-
advantages to proxy access. Supporters argue that proxy access can facilitate greater 
director accountability, enhanced communications among directors and sharehold-
ers, and general governance efficiencies.16 Those who oppose proxy access empha-
size that it can distract directors and management, allow special interests to gain 
board representation, and add unnecessary cost and delay to the election process.17 
As with most worthy debates, the truth likely lies somewhere in the middle and de-
pends on the particular company, its unique circumstances, and the makeup of its 
shareholder base.18 
The targeted proxy access proposal suggested by this Article strikes an appropri-
ate balance among these competing considerations. It would not grant proxy access 
in all cases. To the extent a company is doing well, the management of the company 
should be in the hands of the board and management team without the potential dis-
traction and costs of shareholder proxy access. If the company experiences difficul-
ties that are not timely addressed, however, shareholders should have greater access 
to the ballot to facilitate and assist in the company’s turnaround efforts. Both boards 
and shareholders may be able to support such a balanced approach.  
Notably, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed a kind of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. Institutional shareholders and private funds typically scrutinize proposals and con-
sider the need for the bylaw and the terms of the proposal. See, e.g., David Benoit, BlackRock 
Takes Its Own Advice on Proxy Access, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (Oct. 7, 2015, 4:39 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/10/07/blackrock-takes-its-own-advice-on-proxy-access/ 
[https://perma.cc/C2A8-EAAB] (noting that BlackRock was giving its shareholders an 
opportunity to vote on a proxy access proposal at its annual meeting and that, with respect to 
other companies, “BlackRock and others have said they’ll review each company’s proposed 
rule individually”). 
 16. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access 
Debate, 65 BUS. LAW. 329 (2010) (advocating for proxy access as a default regulatory rule 
and outlining governance benefits); Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder 
Engagement?, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 824–30 (highlighting benefits of proxy access in 
context of increasing board-shareholder dialogue); Fairfax, supra note 6 (positing that proxy 
access is more effective than other shareholder governance tools). 
 17. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, 
Economics, and the Law, 65 BUS. LAW. 361 (2010) (criticizing proxy access regulation); 
Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. REV. 1347 
(2011) (arguing that proxy access would have little impact on corporate governance); Bernard 
S. Sharfman, Why Proxy Access Is Harmful to Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 387 
(2012) (highlighting structural deficiencies in proxy access that undercut its utility); see also 
Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of Corporate Governance, 
37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731 (2013) (arguing that federal law should not regulate, among other 
things, proxy access); J.W. Verret, Defending Against Shareholder Proxy Access: Delaware’s 
Future Reviewing Company Defenses in the Era of Dodd-Frank, 36 J. CORP. L. 391, 397–404 
(2011) (reviewing various perspectives on shareholder empowerment and proxy access). 
 18. But see Bernard S. Sharfman, What Theory and the Empirical Evidence Tell Us About 
Proxy Access, J. L. ECON. & POL. (May 11, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=2757761. 
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contingent proxy access in 2003 that would have given shareholders the ability to 
nominate directors through the proxy statement under certain circumstances 
unrelated to a company’s financial health.19 Although some opposed the concept, 
others supported such a refined approach to proxy access.20 Similar to the SEC’s 
2003 proposal, the targeted proxy access discussed in this Article rests on the notion 
that not all companies may benefit from proxy access in all cases. The targeted proxy 
access proposal, however, differs from the prior SEC proposal in two important 
respects: companies and shareholders would implement such proxy access through 
private ordering (and not federal regulation), and they would tailor the triggers to the 
particular company, avoiding the complexity and uncertainty that plagues a one-size-
fits-all approach.21 
The effectiveness of targeted proxy access would depend largely on the terms of 
the bylaw itself, which should be drafted and evaluated on a company-by-company 
basis. In general, the triggers for proxy access should be objective and well defined—
for example, a material default under a credit facility or bond issuance; a re-
structuring, refinancing, or forbearance to avoid a material default under a credit fa-
cility or bond issuance; a downgrade by one of the major ratings agencies; or a certain 
number of consecutive quarters of significant losses.22 The Article draws on concepts 
and terminology familiar to public companies under the disclosure guidelines estab-
lished by the SEC for the Form 8-K: Current Report to guide the applicable triggers.23 
The bylaw also should seek to align the interests of the company and the shareholders 
eligible to nominate directors once the bylaw is triggered.24 Accordingly, both the 
percentage and duration of ownership should be considered; proponents of targeted 
proxy access could follow the three percent, three-year ownership model currently 
invoked in many proxy access proposals, or they could recognize the urgency of the 
triggers and invoke more lenient shareholder eligibility requirements and an acceler-
ated nomination process akin to that granted preferred stockholders under many cer-
tificates and exchange listing requirements.25 
                                                                                                                 
 
 19. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Release Nos. 33-9136, 34-62764, 75 
Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,68081 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 
249) (explaining the triggers under the 2003 proposal as (i) one of the company’s nominees 
“received withhold votes from more than 35% of the votes cast at an annual meeting” or (ii) a 
shareholder proposal to adopt a shareholder nomination procedure “received more than 50% 
of the votes cast on that proposal at the meeting”). 
 20. See id. at 56,681. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See infra Part III.B (including proposed language for a targeted proxy access bylaw). 
 23. See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 8-K: CURRENT REPORT, https://www.sec.gov/about 
/forms/form8-k.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4CU-T8KD] (requiring disclosures concerning, 
among other things, material definitive agreements and direct financial obligations). 
 24. See infra Part III.B. 
 25. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 313.00(C) (2016), http:// 
nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/bookmark.asp?id=sx-ruling-nyse-policymanual_313.00 
&manual=/lcm/sections/lcm-sections/ [https://perma.cc/XKD6-AJ5S] (“Preferred stock, vot-
ing as a class, should have the right to elect a minimum of two directors upon default of the 
equivalent of six quarterly dividends. . . . The preferred stock quorum should be low enough 
to ensure that the right to elect directors can be exercised as soon as it accrues.”); see also infra 
notes 211–19 and accompanying text (discussing potential modifications to shareholder 
2016] TARGETED PROXY ACCESS  233 
 
In addition to proxy access mechanics, the Article emphasizes the importance of 
detailed shareholder disclosures and position statements to the utility of targeted 
proxy access. Shareholders nominating directors should be required to provide at 
least two kinds of individual disclosures: (i) information about their own holdings to 
allow boards and other shareholders to evaluate whether the interests of the nominat-
ing shareholders are generally aligned with the company, or whether the nominating 
shareholders instead hold an adverse agenda; and (ii) the qualifications, experience, 
and other relevant information about their nominee(s).26 Shareholders also should 
endeavor to submit a position statement for the proxy materials that supports their 
nominees and explains their justifications for the requested change in leadership. 
As discussed in Part I.B, information provided to shareholders by management 
may be biased or limited in scope and perspective.27 The Darden Restaurants, Inc. 
case study set forth in Part II.C illustrates the problems posed by such limited disclo-
sures and how more robust disclosures by a shareholder in the context of a proxy 
contest may assist a company and its shareholders.28 Admittedly, boards and man-
agement resist competing informational disclosures in proxy materials. Nevertheless, 
on balance and in cases of underperforming management or distressed situations, 
such disclosures challenge management to make better decisions and encourage 
shareholders to hold management accountable if warranted.29 The case studies and 
targeted proxy access discussed in this Article highlight the potential value to proxy 
access in distressed situations, whether under a targeted or a more general proxy ac-
cess bylaw. The design of targeted proxy access, however, offers incentives and 
benefits not available through more traditional, general proxy access methodology.  
Despite the potential value of targeted proxy access, boards, shareholders, and 
other stakeholders may demur.30 Boards may be hesitant to cede control, even when 
their performance or the challenges faced by the company suggest a new approach 
or perspective is necessary. Shareholders may believe the proposal is too limited and 
that they should have greater access to the ballot regardless of how the board and 
company are performing. And other stakeholders (e.g., bondholders or employees) 
may question shareholders’ interests in the company as the company’s financial dis-
tress grows more severe. The proposal considers these and other potential barriers to 
the effectiveness of targeted proxy access. Importantly, the proposal incorporates 
important safeguards and strikes a balance based on an objective that benefits all 
sides: a profitable and stable company. A board of directors of a company with a 
targeted proxy access bylaw will have every incentive to manage the company’s op-
erational and financial challenges more proactively and avoid the triggers of the 
bylaw. Shareholders and other stakeholders of that company should be well served 
                                                                                                                 
 
eligibility requirements, including the mandated holding period, to allow more effective 
shareholder intervention in times of distress). 
 26. See infra text accompanying notes 217–19 (discussing proposed disclosures in more 
detail and their relation to the disclosures required by the SEC’s Schedule 14N under 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14n-101). 
 27. See infra Part I.B. 
 28. See infra Part II.C. 
 29. See infra Parts III.B–III.C. 
 30. See infra Part III.C (examining the potential implementation challenges to the targeted 
proxy access proposal). 
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as a result, with shareholders having appropriate recourse if management fails in 
those efforts.31 
Part I of the Article frames the primary underlying issue: potentially ineffective 
or conflicted decision making by boards of directors, particularly in times of financial 
distress. This section provides an overview of directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duties 
and explains how those duties fail to provide adequate guidance in certain circum-
stances. Part II then discusses in more detail one such circumstance—boards making 
decisions in the presence or under the influence of activist investors. Notably, both 
shareholder and debtholder activism can impact board decision making. This section 
sets forth two different case studies—one of Darden Restaurants, Inc. and one of 
RadioShack Corp.—to illustrate different approaches to activism and potential con-
sequences for the targets. Part III draws on the prior sections, including the case stud-
ies, to develop the justifications for, and key features of, the targeted proxy access 
bylaw. The Article concludes by discussing the potential value for all stakeholders 
of the additional information and new perspectives offered by targeted proxy access 
and the presence of shareholder nominees on the boards of distressed companies.  
I. THE PROBLEM: FIDUCIARIES SERVING MULTIPLE MASTERS  
A board of directors manages the affairs of the corporation for the benefit of the 
corporate entity and its shareholders.32 This division of management and ownership 
creates agency costs, as no one shareholder necessarily has the economic incentive 
to monitor the board and hold it accountable.33 Moreover, a board must possess a 
certain level of autonomy to govern a corporation effectively.34 Striking the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. As a company’s insolvency deepens, shareholders arguably have less of an interest in 
the company and may have skewed incentives with respect to the company’s alternatives for 
preserving value. Accordingly, the timing of any shareholder intervention is an important con-
sideration in designing and implementing targeted proxy access. Part III.B proposes triggers 
that permit shareholder intervention during the early stages of financial or operational distress. 
It also proposes limitations on that access as a company’s financial condition deteriorates. See, 
e.g., infra note 212.  
 32. State law generally delegates all management authority to the board of directors of 
the corporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011) (“The business and affairs 
of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction 
of a board of directors . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (“All 
corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors of the 
corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the 
direction . . . of its board of directors . . . .”). A company’s insolvency may impact the benefi-
ciaries of directors’ duties. See infra note 40. 
 33. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of 
Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency 
Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327 (1983); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. 
Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997). 
 34. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the 
Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 424 (2001) (“Rather than 
being agents, directors play a role that more closely resembles that of an autonomous trustee 
or fiduciary who is charged with serving another’s interests.”); Donald C. Langevoort, The 
Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of 
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appropriate balance between board autonomy and accountability is an ongoing 
challenge in corporate governance law.35 
A company experiencing financial distress perhaps illustrates this challenge most 
vividly.36 The board of a distressed company needs the financial flexibility to, for 
example, incur additional debt or refinance old debt; change operational course; and 
implement layoffs, consolidations, closures, or other restructuring decisions. Never-
theless, the extent of each of these measures and what is reasonable and appropriate 
under the circumstances are in many respects subjective determinations.37 Many 
questions arise: Is the board jeopardizing the long-term health of the company by 
implementing short-term remedies? Is the board moving too slowly or too quickly? 
Who is benefiting most from the board’s decisions—shareholders, creditors, or the board? 
State corporate law attempts to guide a board’s determinations in these and other 
scenarios through either common law or statutory fiduciary duties.38 Board members 
and senior officers generally owe a duty of care and loyalty to the corporate entity 
and its shareholders.39 Financial distress not only blurs the boundaries of these 
                                                                                                                 
 
Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 801–03, 813–19 (2001) (explaining the 
three primary functions of a board, including monitoring, and how an appropriate balance of 
independent and insider directors can mitigate biases that otherwise impede a board’s 
effectiveness). 
 35. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as A[b]stention 
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 109 (2004) (“Establishing the proper mix of deference and 
accountability thus emerges as the central problem in applying the business judgment rule to 
particular situations.”). 
 36. For a general discussion of issues facing boards of directors of financially distressed 
companies, see Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic Griffin, Facilitating Successful 
Failures, 66 FLA. L. REV. 205 (2014). See also Stephen J. Lubben, The Board’s Duty To Keep 
Its Options Open, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 817, 819 (2015) (“[S]tate corporate law imposes a duty 
on the board to carefully consider any decision that will foreclose a future board’s choices. In 
times of financial distress, this duty includes an obligation to carefully consider the effects of 
a particular decision on future restructuring options.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Russell C. Silberglied, Litigating Fiduciary Duty Claims in Bankruptcy 
Court and Beyond: Theory and Practical Considerations in an Evolving Environment, 10 J. 
BUS. & TECH. L. 181 (2015) (examining, among other things, board decisions underlying 
creditor and shareholder litigation in the distressed context). 
 38. See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 712 (2011) (describing general duties of fi-
duciaries). Whether directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duties are based in common law or stat-
ute (or some combination of the two) varies by state. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 
(2011) (“A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a member 
of a committee, in accordance with his good faith business judgment of the best interests of 
the corporation.”); Willard v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 515 S.E.2d 277, 284 (Va. 1999) 
(“Code § 13.1-690(A) does not abrogate the common law duties of a director. It does, however, 
set the standard by which a director is to discharge those duties.”); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT §§ 8.308.31 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (standards of conduct and liability for directors); 
Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 701, 705 (2011) (“The 
[Delaware] General Assembly has never addressed the fiduciary duties of corporate officers, 
leaving that subject entirely to the judiciary, which has likewise largely neglected these duties. 
The General Assembly, however, has addressed the fiduciary duties of corporate directors, but 
not to permit curtailing or negating those duties.” (footnote omitted)).  
 39. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009) (“In the past, we have 
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fiduciary duties,40 but it also creates opportunities for conflicts of interest and self-
dealing on the part of multiple parties. This section examines existing checks on a 
board’s autonomy and accountability, highlighting weaknesses that often lead to 
corporate governance failures and shareholder loss. 
A. Overview of a Board’s Fiduciary Duties 
Corporate board members and senior officers are fiduciaries.41 These individuals 
generally owe fiduciary duties, including duties of care and loyalty, to the corporate 
entity and its shareholders.42 In theory, such obligations should deter misconduct and 
produce beneficial outcomes. In practice, however, fiduciary duties are limited in 
                                                                                                                 
 
implied that officers of Delaware corporations, like directors, owe fiduciary duties of care and 
loyalty, and that the fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of directors. We now 
explicitly so hold.” (footnote omitted)); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David K. Millon, Recalling 
Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005). See generally 
Silberglied, supra note 37. 
 40. Questions arise concerning whether directors continue to owe their fiduciary duties 
solely to the corporation and shareholders as the corporate entity approaches insolvency. Some 
courts suggest that such duties may be owed to the corporate enterprise, which includes stake-
holders other than shareholders. The Delaware Supreme Court has clarified “that the creditors 
of a Delaware corporation that is either insolvent or in the zone of insolvency have no right, 
as a matter of law, to assert direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty against the corporation’s 
directors.” N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 94 
(Del. 2007); see also Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Boyle, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875, 894 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2009) (“[W]e hold that there is no fiduciary duty prescribed under California law that is 
owed to creditors by directors of a corporation solely by virtue of its operating in the ‘zone’ 
or ‘vicinity’ of insolvency.”). The Delaware Chancery Court has further explained that credi-
tors may bring derivative claims against corporate officers and directors for alleged breaches 
of their fiduciary duties when the corporation is insolvent and that such standard does not 
require the corporation to be “irretrievably insolvent.” Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. 
Vertin, 115 A.3d 535, 556–61 (Del. Ch. 2015). 
 41. Silberglied, supra note 37.  
 42. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc., 930 A.2d at 99 (“It is 
well established that the directors owe their fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its 
shareholders.”); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 
(Del. 1986) (“[T]he directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and 
its shareholders.”). Although most commentators agree that directors and officers owe fiduci-
ary duties to the corporation, they do not agree that such duties also run to the corporation’s 
shareholders. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment: Explaining 
Anomalies in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719, 731 (2006) (“There is very little in corporate 
law that supports [shareholder wealth maximization] and much that cuts against it.”); D. 
Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998) (arguing against a 
shareholder primacy norm). For a thoughtful review of the competing theories of corporate 
governance and a recommendation for a more nimble, less board-centric approach, see 
Anthony J. Casey & M. Todd Henderson, The Boundaries of “Team” Production of Corporate 
Governance, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 365 (2015). See also supra note 40 (discussing directors’ 
duties in the context of insolvency). 
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scope and effect,43 as well as by the reality that the decisionmakers are human,44 and 
there rarely is one correct answer.  
The duty of care requires board members and officers to serve the corporation in 
good faith and with the same level of diligence, care, and skill of a reasonably pru-
dent businessperson.45 Although the standard sounds stringent, a board’s duty of care 
and resulting decisions are protected by the business judgment rule, which is a re-
buttable presumption that the board acted in good faith, on an informed basis, and in 
the best interests of the corporation.46 Plaintiffs typically find it difficult to overcome 
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. See Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 
785 (2011) (arguing that “the board of directors in a large public corporation is ineffective to 
perform the functions assigned to it and should thus be eliminated in favor of a governance 
system that more accurately reflects corporate decision making”). For in-depth discussions of 
limitations on board effectiveness based on board composition, see Lisa M. Fairfax, The 
Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127 (2010); Nicola Faith Sharpe, The 
Cosmetic Independence of Corporate Boards, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1435, 1453–56 (2011). 
 44. A rich literature exists examining the human component of corporate boards. See, e.g., 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2002); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and 
the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1807–10 (2001); 
Regina F. Burch, The Myth of the Unbiased Director, 41 AKRON L. REV. 509, 510–14 (2008); 
James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and 
Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 83, 
83–84, 99–108; Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective 
Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323, 363–65 (2007); Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry 
into the Responsibility of Corporations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Cli-
mate: The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 2–4 (2003); Kent Greenfield, 
Using Behavioral Economics To Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regu-
latory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 583–85 (2002); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized 
Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and 
Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 107 (1997); Donald C. Langevoort, Re-
setting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-
Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 288 
(2004); Oliver Marnet, Behavior and Rationality in Corporate Governance, 39 J. ECON. ISSUES 
613, 614, 619 (2005); Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Independ-
ence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 286–89 (2009). For an interesting proposal to use “board ser-
vice providers” in lieu of natural persons, see Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, 
Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051 (2014). 
 45. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (“[I]t appears 
that directors of a corporation in managing the corporate affairs are bound to use that amount 
of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances. Their 
duties are those of control, and whether or not by neglect they have made themselves liable 
for failure to exercise proper control depends on the circumstances and facts of the particular case.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) (“The business judg-
ment rule has been well formulated by Aronson and other cases[ that it] ‘is a presumption that 
in making a business decision the directors . . . acted on an informed basis, in good faith and 
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the corporation.’[] Thus, 
directors’ decisions will be respected by courts unless the directors are interested or lack in-
dependence relative to the decision, do not act in good faith, act in a manner that cannot be 
attributed to a rational business purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process 
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the business judgment rule and succeed in litigation against corporate directors and 
officers, unless the plaintiffs can demonstrate a breach of the duty of loyalty.47 The 
duty of loyalty is fairly broad and encompasses self-dealing, conflicts of interest, and 
bad faith.48 Importantly, alleged breaches of the duty of loyalty are not protected by 
the business judgment rule. 
The literature concerning fiduciary duty litigation suggests that relatively few 
judgments are entered against corporate directors and officers.49 Rather, such litiga-
tion often is resolved in favor of the defendants at the motion to dismiss or summary 
judgment stage, or settled prior to trial.50 Most of the literature also questions the 
value of any judgment or settlement to the corporation because—particularly in the 
settlement context—the monetary component typically covers primarily attorneys’ 
fees, and the promised corporate governance reforms are either of nominal impact or 
already in place.51 Two notable exceptions to this general rule are in the context of 
governance failures and securities litigation: the outside directors of WorldCom and 
Enron agreed to pay approximately $24 million and $13 million, respectively, to set-
tle securities class action litigation against them relating to collapse of their 
companies.52 
                                                                                                                 
 
that includes the failure to consider all material facts reasonably available.” (quoting Aronson 
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (omission in original)). 
 47. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Whatever the terminology, 
the fact is that liability is rarely imposed upon corporate directors or officers simply for bad 
judgment and this reluctance to impose liability for unsuccessful business decisions has been 
doctrinally labelled the business judgment rule.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[T]he fiduciary duty of 
loyalty is not limited to cases involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of 
interest. It also encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith. . . . ‘[A] di-
rector cannot act loyally towards the corporation unless she acts in the good faith belief that 
her actions are in the corporation’s best interest.’” (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 
506 n. 34 (Del. Ch. 2003))). 
 49. See Ann M. Scarlett, A Better Approach for Balancing Authority and Accountability 
in Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 39, 40 (2008) (“Shareholder deriva-
tive litigation, however, rarely succeeds in holding directors liable for their decisions.”). 
 50. Id. at 59 (“Under any formulation of the business judgment rule, it operates as a de-
fense asserted in shareholder derivative actions that challenge a decision made by a corpora-
tion’s board of directors. Procedurally, defendants have been allowed to assert their business 
judgment defense on a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment, and at 
trial.”(footnote omitted)). 
 51. See generally Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: 
Evidence from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 
(2007) (studying risk factors relevant to directors’ and officers’ liability insurance markets and 
analyzing merits and results of director and officer litigation); Jessica Erickson, Corporate 
Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749 (2010) 
(discussing general perception that shareholder derivative litigation lacks meaningful value 
for corporate shareholders and presenting evidence that such litigation may do little to enhance 
corporate governance measures at targeted firms). 
 52. See, e.g., Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director 
Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1057, 1059 (2006) (study discusses WorldCom and Enron 
settlements, but finds that such personal liability for outside directors is the exception rather 
than the rule).  
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Despite its low success rate, fiduciary duty litigation arguably has a strong deter-
rent effect. No director or officer wants to be embroiled in years of very public liti-
gation, even if they know they likely will succeed in the end.53 Moreover, fiduciary 
duties do provide general guidance for directors and officers—a basic framework for 
making the tough decisions. Unfortunately, the flexibility in this framework may al-
low external factors to compromise its utility. 
Consider the following two scenarios: In the first, the board is evaluating a sale 
of the company to an insider. In the second, the board is contemplating a rescue-
financing package that will significantly increase the corporation’s leverage and de-
crease its operational discretion. In both scenarios, the board must balance the inter-
ests of the company and its shareholders. Most boards also will at least analyze the 
impact of the transaction on employees, officers, creditors, and perhaps their own 
professional careers. The influence of each respective factor on the board’s decision 
will depend to some extent on the governing law,54 but likely also will be driven in 
some part by the parties at the negotiating table. 
Notably, existing best practices treat these two scenarios very differently. Many 
corporations will utilize independent board committees or special approval proce-
dures for interested party transactions to mitigate the influence of external factors in 
the first scenario.55 Such protective measures are not the norm, however, in the sec-
ond scenario. Yet directors in the second scenario may face significantly more pres-
sure from particular interest groups, increased opportunities for conflicts of interest 
and self-dealing, and arguments that some duties are owed to creditors if the com-
pany is in fact insolvent. The next section considers these competing factors and their 
potential consequences for the company and its shareholders. 
B. Additional Challenges for a Board of a Distressed Company 
A company experiencing financial distress can invoke a number of alternatives to 
ameliorate its distress and return to profitability.56 It can implement operational 
changes that reduce costs and streamline production or the provision of services. It 
can sell noncore assets or pursue strategic partners. It also can explore balance sheet 
                                                                                                                 
 
 53. See id. at 1056 (“The principal threats to outside directors . . . are the time, aggrava-
tion, and potential harm to reputation that a lawsuit can entail . . . .”). 
 54. Although many states have statutes that permit boards to consider the interests of 
stakeholders other than shareholders in making decisions, commentators debate the impact of 
these statutes (and, notably, Delaware does not have a constituency statute). See, e.g., ANDREW 
KEAY, THE ENLIGHTENED SHAREHOLDER VALUE PRINCIPLE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
195–99 (2013); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed 
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761 (2015); see also supra note 40 (dis-
cussing directors’ duties in the context of insolvency). 
 55. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (2011); Scott V. Simpson & Katherine 
Brody, The Evolving Role of Special Committees in M&A Transactions: Seeking Business 
Judgment Rule Protection in the Context of Controlling Shareholder Transactions and Other 
Corporate Transactions Involving Conflicts of Interest, 69 BUS. LAW. 1117 (2014). 
 56. See generally NAVIGATING TODAY’S ENVIRONMENT: THE DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ 
GUIDE TO RESTRUCTURING (John Wm. (“Jack”) Butler, Jr. ed., 2010) (reviewing frequent 
causes of distress and alternatives for resolving it). 
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adjustments to enhance liquidity or obtain additional financing until the underlying 
source of the distress is resolved. Financing alternatives can include a new debt or 
equity offering, an out-of-court workout with existing lenders, a refinancing with 
new lenders, or an in-court reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.57  
In any event, the board of a distressed company must make difficult choices. The 
board must, for example, weigh the interests of creditors and shareholders. Financial 
distress exemplifies the traditional conflict between creditors and shareholders, with 
creditors often desiring a more conservative course sufficient to pay off the debt and 
shareholders often wanting more aggressive action resulting in debt repayment and 
equity value for shareholders.58 The board also likely will consider the interests of 
the company’s employees and the company’s relationships with suppliers and com-
munities.59 The one alternative that in theory could satisfy all of these competing 
interests—that is, resolving the company’s financial distress out-of-court through a 
workout or refinancing that does not require significant closures or layoffs—may not 
be attainable. Nevertheless, a board may pursue such an alternative at all costs. 
In such steadfast pursuit, a board may be justified in its approach, or it may be 
blinded by heuristics, denial, or the influence of a particular constituent.60 For exam-
ple, a board and the officers may believe that they have the talent and experience to 
turn around the company’s financial situation if simply given enough time.61 They 
may be committed to a particular course of action that they designed and imple-
mented.62 They may not recognize the severity of the company’s financial 
condition.63 Notably, some or all of these and similar conditions may cause a board 
                                                                                                                 
 
 57. See Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications 
of Activist Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 728–41 (2008) (reviewing 
each alternative for resolving financial distress by exploring the rights of debtholders in dis-
tressed situations). 
 58. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. & Christopher W. Frost, Managers’ Fiduciary Duties 
in Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos in Delaware (and Elsewhere), 32 J. CORP. L. 
491, 514 (2007) (“Once a corporation issues debt, shareholders have an incentive to over-
invest in risky projects, while creditors have an incentive to avoid risk. Because shareholders, 
as residual claimants, share the risk of loss with creditors but reap the gains from success, they 
have an appetite for risk that increases with leverage.”); see also Michael C. Jensen & William 
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (discussing shareholder-bondholder conflict generally). 
 59. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 60. See supra note 44. 
 61. See, e.g., Hersh Shefrin, Behavioral Corporate Finance, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 
2001, at 113, 117–18 (discussing overconfidence bias and poor corporate decision making); 
Dan Lovallo & Daniel Kahneman, Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines 
Executives’ Decisions, HARV. BUS. REV., July 2003, at 56, 58 (discussing impact of cognitive 
biases on business decisions). 
 62. See Ian Weinstein, Don’t Believe Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in Legal 
Decision Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783, 796–97 (2003) (discussing framing or anchoring 
bias as “the tendency to view a given problem in different terms depending on the perspective 
from which the problem is viewed”). 
 63. See Harner & Griffin, supra note 36, at 208 (explaining that “[o]strich syndrome re-
fers to management’s tendency to stick its collective head in the sand and ignore the warning 
signs of financial distress until it is too late to effectively resolve that distress.”). 
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to back the company into a negotiating corner with lenders, creating a “win-win” 
situation for the lender and a “partial win-complete loss” situation for the company 
and its stakeholders.  
Why do these conditions create a win-win for the lenders only? It boils down to 
basic negotiating theory: the lenders have something that the board desperately wants 
and will give most anything to get; the board also likely has little to offer the lenders 
in return.64 The result often is a workout or new financing package that stacks the 
deck in favor of the lenders, with extremely tight covenants for the company and 
veto rights for the lenders. If the company is able to use the financing to resolve the 
underlying distress, everyone wins, including the lenders, who will be repaid in full 
at extremely high rates. If the company is unsuccessful, the lenders still win, but in 
this scenario they do not share the victory. The lenders likely will be able to take over 
the company and either continue to run it for their own benefit (after downsizing or 
fixing any operational issues), sell it as a going concern (typically at a large profit), 
or foreclose on the assets for a recovery to the exclusion of all other stakeholders.65 
From the lenders’ perspective, the win-win scenario described above is fair and 
equitable, as all parties are getting exactly what they bargained for. Indeed, the 
lenders generally are entitled to the benefit of their bargain. From the company’s 
perspective, a win for the lenders only likely means a loss—perhaps significant 
losses—for the company’s other stakeholders. In particular, the company’s existing 
shareholders will be wiped out, existing creditors (other than the winning lenders) 
will receive little if any recovery on their claims, and many (if not all) of the com-
pany’s employees will be laid off.66 Absent fraud or misconduct, these losses are not 
                                                                                                                 
 
 64. See Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with 
Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 19 (2000) (“In most relation-
ships, power flows from the more dependent to the less dependent party.”). For a general dis-
cussion of negotiating leverage in transactional settings, see DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. 
SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE 
GAIN (1986). 
 65. This strategy often is referred to as a loan-to-own situation, in which the lender’s pri-
mary objective is “controlling and owning the reorganized company upon the debtor’s emer-
gence from bankruptcy.” Michelle M. Harner, Paul E. Harner, Catherine M. Martin & Aaron 
M. Singer, Distressed Debt Investing, in ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS: INSTRUMENTS, 
PERFORMANCE, BENCHMARKS, AND STRATEGIES 303, 306–08 (H. Kent Baker & Greg Filbeck 
eds., 2013) (exploring investment strategies with respect to distressed companies); see also 
Harner, supra note 57, at 714 (explaining loan-to-own investment strategy). 
 66. In a bankruptcy case or out-of-court liquidation scenario, creditors are generally paid 
according to federal bankruptcy law or state law priorities, which pays secured creditors first, 
followed by general unsecured creditors, followed last by equity holders. There are frequently 
multiple tranches of creditors within each general category, and each class of creditors must 
be paid in full before a lower class can receive any distributions. Consequently, in many in-
stances, unsecured creditors receive nominal recoveries and equity holders receive nothing. In 
addition, employees lose their jobs and trade creditors lose business. See, e.g., Circuit City 
Unplugged: Why Did Chapter 11 Fail To Save 34,000 Jobs?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong., 2 (2009) 
(statement of Steve Cohen, Chairman, Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law) 
(“Before [its bankruptcy] filing, Circuit City was one of the Nation's largest retailers, with 
more than 700 store locations, and more than 34,000 employees. In less than 4 months after 
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the fault of the winning lenders; these losses are the risk for which the company 
bargained. The crux of the issue thus lies in the bargain itself. It also suggests that 
the board and officers need additional information and assistance in making pre-
insolvency decisions.  
This suggestion does not mean that boards are incapable of serving the corpora-
tion’s interests. Many boards are very effective, and most directors work hard to try 
to get it right. The corporate governance landscape is, however, complicated. Partic-
ularly as a company approaches distress, directors are called upon to separate noise 
from substance. The presence of activists can blur this distinction. Accordingly, the 
Article next analyzes the role of activists before evaluating tools to improve board 
decisions. 
II. CONFOUNDING FACTORS: ACTIVIST SHAREHOLDERS AND DEBTHOLDERS 
Historically, corporate activism has had a negative connotation and has been most 
frequently associated with corporate raiders and vultures.67 “Activists” are viewed as 
threats to existing management with an interest only in short-term profitability and 
self-benefiting transactions. The corporate raiders of the 1980s often are held up as 
the face of activism, and “greed is good” is thrown out as its slogan.68 
Although there is undoubtedly some truth to that notion, activists are not a mono-
lithic group, and some of their tactics may work to benefit not only themselves, but 
also other corporate stakeholders. This Part examines the role of shareholder and 
debtholder activists in corporate America and concludes with a detailed case study 
of each. 
A. Shareholder Activism 
Most shareholders, particularly those owning stock in larger corporations, are pas-
sive investors.69 They make a fixed monetary investment when they purchase their 
                                                                                                                 
 
filing for Chapter 11, however, Circuit City closed all of its doors, and virtually all of its em-
ployees are now without jobs, jobless.”); see also id. at 8 (testimony of Harvey R. Miller, Weil, 
Gotschal & Manges, LLP); David R. Jury, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, United Steelworkers, Written 
Statement Submitted to the ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11: Field 
Hearing at the American College of Bankruptcy, 1 (Mar. 14, 2013) (statement available at 
http://commission.abi.org/field-hearing-acb-thursday-march-14 [https://perma.cc/7E9F-7R4Q]) 
(“Between 1998 and 2003, the domestic steel industry experienced a crisis brought on by a 
tide of imports which flooded the market and drove steel prices down to 20-year lows. The 
result was 44 bankruptcies, 18 liquidations and the loss of 55,000 jobs.”). 
 67. For a general discussion of the characterization of activists as raiders, see Nicole M. 
Boyson & Robert M. Mooradian, Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism, 14 REV. 
DERIVATIVES RES. 169 (2011); Michelle M. Harner, Activist Distressed Debtholders: The New 
Barbarians at the Gate, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 155, 164–67 (2011). 
 68. See generally ROBERT SLATER, THE TITANS OF TAKEOVER (Beard Books 1999) (1987) 
(analyzing transactions pursued by activists in 1980s); Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, 
Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional 
Investors, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 275 (2000) (reviewing literature on activist transactions in 1980s). 
 69. For an interesting commentary on the performance of activist versus passive share-
holders in 2014, see Stephen Gandel, Passive Investors Crushed the Activists in 2014, 
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stock, and they then rely on the corporation’s board and officers, and perhaps other 
investors, to manage and grow the value of their investment. Moreover, many share-
holders hold stock in larger corporations through mutual funds or other third-party 
managed investment vehicles, thereby further removing them from active manage-
ment of the company.70 This passive investor model exacerbates the agency costs 
associated with the American model of the corporation (i.e., separation of ownership 
and management).71 
Not all shareholders, however, are passive investors. Some shareholders strategi-
cally invest in companies where they perceive a need for change.72 That change may 
involve replacing management or the board, pursuing acquisitions or asset disposi-
tions, restructuring operations, or encouraging the company to adopt other measures 
that arguably would unlock value if implemented correctly. Although some such 
changes could improve the value of the company over the longer term, many changes 
have a shorter-term focus.73 
For example, some activist investors call upon boards to use cash reserves to re-
purchase stock or make larger dividend payments to shareholders.74 This move 
                                                                                                                 
 
FORTUNE (Jan. 9, 2015, 11:21 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/01/09/activist-investors-performance 
-2014/ [https://perma.cc/P85Q-NGPX] (“If you put your money in the S&P 500 and let it sit 
there for the entirety of 2014, your portfolio would have gone up 12%. No proxy fights 
needed.”). 
 70. See Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Institutional 
Investors: Power and Responsibility (Apr. 19, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov 
/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515808 [https://perma.cc/578V-8FR6]) (“For example, 
the proportion of U.S. public equities managed by institutions has risen steadily over the past 
six decades, from about 7 or 8% of market capitalization in 1950, to about 67% in 2010. The 
shift has come as more American families participate in the capital markets through pooled-
investment vehicles, such as mutual funds and exchange traded funds (ETFs).” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 71. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. 
 72. For a general overview of strategies pursued by activist shareholders, see Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015); Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge 
Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008); Brian 
R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge 
Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 58–59 (2011). See also ACTIVIST INSIGHT, ACTIVIST INVESTING: AN 
ANNUAL REVIEW OF TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 10–12 (2015) (“Demands for board 
change have long accounted for the lion’s share of activist campaigns, with M&A-related ac-
tivity a close second. But a spike in balance-sheet activism in 2013 had returned to normal in 
2014, with activists diversifying their objectives to include other governance and more busi-
ness strategy demands.”). 
 73. For an example of the debate concerning the impact of activist shareholders and short-
termism, compare Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term 
Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637 (2013), with Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by 
Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of 
Corporate Law, 114 COLUM L. REV. 449 (2014). 
 74. See, e.g., Vipal Monga, David Benoit & Theo Francis, As Activism Rises, U.S. Firms 
Spend More on Buybacks than Factories, WALL ST. J. (May 26, 2015, 10:30 PM), http:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/companies-send-more-cash-back-to-shareholders-1432693805 [https://perma.cc 
/EU4B-4H2E]. 
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pushes value out to shareholders, but may do so at the expense of the company’s 
longer-term interests—for example, the company accordingly may invest less in re-
search and development, or in maintenance and upgrade initiatives. The company’s 
cash reserves also may ultimately prove insufficient to sustain the company through 
an economic downturn or other unforeseen event. Moody’s has warned bondholders 
that such uses of a company’s cash may weaken the company’s longer-term pro-
spects and, consequently, its ratings.75 
Activist investors also analyze a board’s operational decisions, from the selection 
of director candidates to how the company makes its products. For example, Elliott 
Management sent a letter to the board of Citrix Systems suggesting a new plan for 
operational and managerial improvements.76 This letter stated in part: 
Today, Elliott is formally requesting a meeting with the Board to 
share the details of an operational plan that we believe will create tre-
mendous value for stockholders. What we call the “New Citrix” 
Operating Plan (the “New Citrix Plan”) was developed through exhaus-
tive research and with the help of a full team of operating partners with 
proven experience turning around software companies . . . .  
. . . . 
The New Citrix Plan is based upon two driving principles: the need 
for i) fundamental change and ii) effective oversight. The key compo-
nents for fundamental change are as follows:  
1) Implementation of Operational Best Practices: Citrix’s cost 
structure is the result of years of layered complexity and expenses. The 
structure has become highly inefficient in terms of actual cost and is also 
ineffective at generating revenue growth. We have identified numerous 
opportunities throughout the organization for significant improvement, 
which we believe will result in both superior revenue performance and a 
more efficient use of resources.77 
The letter identified product management as one such opportunity for operational 
improvement: “Citrix’s product portfolio is too broad for its scale and contains far 
too many underperforming product lines that consume valuable resources, have low 
or negative (i.e., loss-making) return profiles, and serve as distractions.”78 Citrix’s 
stock price rose after Elliott announced its 7.1% ownership stake and its communi-
cations with the Citrix board.79  
                                                                                                                 
 
 75. Announcement, Moody’s Investor Servs., Moody’s: Activist Shareholders Gain 
Momentum in 2015; Mainly Negative for Credit Investors (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.moodys 
.com/research/Moodys-Activist-shareholders-gain-momentum-in-2015-mainly-negative-for--PR_322629 
[https://perma.cc/TCE5-H68R] (“In many cases, shareholder activists pursue short-term initi-
atives like share buybacks or special dividends, which have negative implications for credit 
investors.”); see also Monga et al., supra note 74.  
 76. Elliott Sends Letter to Citrix Board of Directors, BUS. WIRE (June 11, 2015, 8:38 AM), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20150611005626/en/Elliott-Sends-Letter-Citrix-Board 
-Directors#.VZ6jkmCIVFI [https://perma.cc/LRZ5-CSPL]. 
 77. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Tiernan Ray, Citrix Surges 7%: Price Targets Zoom as Activists Elliott Call for 
Change, BARRON’S: TECH TRADER DAILY (June 11, 2015, 12:07 PM), http://blogs.barrons.com 
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Activism that evaluates and questions a board’s decisions may provide valuable 
oversight and discipline. For this reason, some commentators herald activism as a 
necessary and meaningful check on management that enhances management’s ac-
countability.80 Others perceive activism as a channel for shareholder engagement 
with management. As SEC Chair Mary Jo White observed in her comments on ac-
tivism: “Increasingly, companies are talking to their shareholders, including so-
called activist ones. That, in my view, is generally a very good thing. Increased 
engagement is important and a growing necessity for many companies today.”81 Aca-
demic studies also suggest that activism can enhance shareholder value.82 
Not all commentators agree, however, that shareholder activists are a positive in-
fluence on corporate boards.83 These commentators raise concerns regarding, among 
other things, activists’ motivation and their typical focus on short-term returns.84 The 
potential misalignment among the interests of the activist, other shareholders, and 
the corporate entity does undercut any generalization about constructive activism. 
Nevertheless, as discussed below in Part III, with appropriate safeguards, activism 
may circumstantially work to serve the interests of the corporation. 
                                                                                                                 
 
/techtraderdaily/2015/06/11/citrix-surges-7-price-targets-zoom-as-activists-elliott-call-for-change/ 
[https://perma.cc/9MJX-KA9C]. Citrix responded to Elliott’s letter with the following 
statement: 
Citrix has always maintained an ongoing dialogue with our shareholders, and we 
welcome their input. We will review Elliott’s suggestions and respond as we do 
with all shareholders who engage with us. The Citrix Board and management 
team continually evaluate ideas to drive shareholder value and are committed to 
acting in the best interests of all our shareholders. 
Press Release, Citrix Comments on Letter from Elliott Management (June 11, 2015), http:// 
investors.citrix.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=917612 [https://perma.cc/ZAX4-A8J6].  
 80. See supra note 72. 
 81. Chair Mary Jo White, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, A Few Observations on 
Shareholders in 2015 (Mar. 19, 2015) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech 
/observations-on-shareholders-2015.html [https://perma.cc/3U4H-YZF8]) (citation omitted). 
 82. See supra note 72; see also Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, Hedge Fund 
Activism: A Review, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS FIN. 185 (2009) (reviewing literature). For a general 
description of data showing a short-termism effect, see Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-
Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 977 (2013). 
 83. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate 
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265 (2012); P. Alexander Quimby, Note, Addressing Corporate 
Short-Termism Through Loyalty Shares, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 389 (2013); Martin Lipton, 
Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the Economy, HARV. L. SCH.: 
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 26, 2013), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/02/26 
/bite-the-apple-poison-the-apple-paralyze-the-company-wreck-the-economy/ [https://perma.cc/7TWB-KLGE]; 
see also Roe, supra note 82, at 987–91 (reviewing literature on short-termism and offering 
theoretical and factual counterarguments). 
 84. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We 
Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates 
Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 26 (2010). 
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B. Debtholder Activism 
Investors not only pursue activist agendas as shareholders, but also as debt-
holders.85 In addition, an investor may hold both stock and debt and use that 
multitranche investment to further its activist interests and influence over the com-
pany.86 An activist debtholder typically has the greatest leverage once the target com-
pany starts to experience financial distress or some kind of liquidity event. In those 
instances, the debtholder can try to extract governance or transactional concessions 
from the board in exchange for a forbearance agreement or restructuring of the under-
lying debt.87 
One common activist-debtholder strategy is the “loan-to-own” situation.88 An in-
vestor will extend new or additional credit to (or agree to restructure its existing 
credit with) a company in exchange for covenants in the loan documents that provide 
the investor with indirect control over decisions such as whether the company can 
sell assets, pay certain other debt obligations, incur additional obligations, or file a 
bankruptcy case. The financial covenants also are set fairly tight, giving the company 
a chance—but not too great of a chance—of meeting its restructuring objectives. The 
failure of the company to do so basically turns over control of the company and 
ownership of the assets to the activist debtholder. 
A loan-to-own strategy can be effected inside or outside of a chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy case. For example, in 2012, Aventine Renewable Energy Holdings, Inc.—an 
ethanol producer in the Midwest—defaulted on its loan obligations and, after receiv-
ing a short forbearance agreement from its lenders, initiated a debt-for-equity ex-
change with its lenders to resolve the default.89 The lenders received 92.5 % of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. See Harner, supra note 57 , at 750–54 (explaining activist-debtholder strategies); see 
also, e.g., Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in 
Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511 (2009); Casey & Henderson, supra note 42, at 376–83 
(discussing creditor influence on firm governance); Michelle M. Harner, Jamie Marincic 
Griffin & Jennifer Ivey-Crickenberger, Activist Investors, Distressed Companies, and Value 
Uncertainty, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 167 (2014) (detailing an empirical study of the role 
of hedge fund investors in distressed debt and reviewing strategies and potential impact of 
such funds); Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private 
Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115 passim (2009) (discussing creditor 
influence on firm governance).  
 86. See infra Part II.D (RadioShack case study); see also Harner, supra note 67, at 162–
63 (providing examples of such investment strategies). 
 87. See Harner, supra note 57, at 712–18 (explaining strategies of activist debtholders). 
 88. See Harner, supra note 67, at 165–69 (providing examples of a loan-to-own strategy). 
 89. See Press Release, Aventine Renewable Energy Holdings, Inc., Aventine Renewable 
Energy Holdings, Inc. Enters into a Significant Restructuring Transaction with Members of 
Its Lender Group (Aug. 20, 2012), http://globenewswire.com/news-release/2012/08/20/483287 
/10002526/en/Aventine-Renewable-Energy-Holdings-Inc-Enters-Into-a-Significant-Restructuring 
-Transaction-With-Members-of-Its-Lender-Group.html [https://perma.cc/B7G6-2VM8]; 
S&P Glob. Mkt. Intelligence, Aventine Lenders Take Over Distressed Company in Out-of-
Court Restructuring, LEVERAGEDLOAN.COM, (Aug. 21, 2012, 3:39 PM), http://www 
.leveragedloan.com/aventine-lenders-take-over-distressed-company-in-out-of-court-restructuring/ 
[https://perma.cc/3SSF-F6L4]. 
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company’s stock, with the remaining equity held by preexisting shareholders.90 
Aventine’s lenders included several hedge funds and private equity firms.91 The CEO 
appointed by the lenders after the change in the ownership was a consultant to several 
private equity firms, with extensive turnaround experience.92 In July 2015 Aventine 
merged with Pacific Ethanol, an ethanol producer in the western United States.93 
Alternatively, lenders can extend postbankruptcy (a.k.a. debtor in possession) 
financing to the company to fund a chapter 11 case designed to sell the company to 
the lenders under § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.94 A § 363 sale can be accomplished 
fairly quickly under existing law, and lenders can acquire exceptionally clean title to 
the assets through a sale free and clear of all liens and encumbrances under § 363(f) 
of the Bankruptcy Code.95 The potential downside to this strategy under chapter 11 
                                                                                                                 
 
 90. See S&P Glob. Mkt. Intelligence, supra note 89. 
 91. Id. 
 92. The biography of Mark Beemer, former CEO of Aventine Renewable, explained that 
“Beemer is an advisor to numerous private equity firms in the ethanol space; he is a member 
of the Turnaround Management Association, the RFA, and the National Grain and Feed 
Association.” Management Team, AVENTINE RENEWABLE ENERGY, INC., http://www.aventinerei 
.com/en/about/management_team/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20140306172410/http://www 
.aventinerei.com/en/about/management_team/]. 
 93. See Press Release, Pacific Ethanol, Inc., Pacific Ethanol Completes Aventine Merger 
(July 1, 2015), https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2015/07/01/749050/10140324/en 
/Pacific-Ethanol-Completes-Aventine-Merger.html [https://perma.cc/7TJR-6NBB]; Press 
Release, Pacific Ethanol, Inc., Stockholders Approve Merger of Pacific Ethanol and Aventine 
(June 11, 2015), https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2015/06/11/744031/10138242/en 
/Stockholders-Approve-Merger-of-Pacific-Ethanol-and-Aventine.html [https://perma.cc 
/29RS-R3TP]. 
 94. Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor, with court approval, to provide 
certain protections to lenders extending credit to the debtor postpetition. 11 U.S.C. § 364 
(2012). Accordingly, lenders often have an incentive to extend such credit. See David A. Skeel, 
Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1905, 1906 (2004) (“[T]he generous terms offered to DIP financers have encouraged lenders 
to make loans to cash-starved debtors, and that these lenders have used their leverage to fill a 
governance vacuum that was created by the enactment of the 1978 Code.”). This postpetition 
financing also may be necessary to fund the debtor’s chapter 11 case to the point of a sale of 
the company in the case. In fact, the terms of the postpetition facility may require such a sale. 
 95. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b), (f) (2012) (authorizing asset sales out of the ordinary course of 
business and free and clear of any liens and interests in such assets, respectively, under certain 
circumstances). Under Bankruptcy Rule 2002(a)(2), a debtor typically must provide twenty-
one days’ notice by mail of “a proposed use, sale, or lease of property of the estate other than 
in the ordinary course of business, unless the court for cause shown shortens the time or directs 
another method of giving notice.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2). Nevertheless, courts may 
approve proposed asset sales on a much quicker basis. See, e.g., Order Under 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 105(a), 363, and 365 and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 2002, 6004 and 6006 
Authorizing and Approving (A) the Sale of Purchased Assets Free and Clear of Liens and 
Other Interests and (B) Assumption and Assignment of Executory Contracts and Unexpired 
Leases, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (JMP), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 
2008), 2008 WL 4385983 (sale approved within seven days of petition date); Melissa B. 
Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862 (2014) (discussing issues with quick asset sales in bankruptcy). 
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is that most bankruptcy courts require the company to subject the lenders’ bid, which 
frequently is a credit bid of the amount owed by the company under the loan docu-
ments, to a public auction process. For example, an affiliate of Silver Point Capital, 
which was pursuing a loan-to-own strategy and was the stalking horse bidder in a 
chapter 11 sale process,96 lost its attempt to acquire print company Standard Register 
Co. Silver Point’s credit bid was $275 million, and the winning bid, submitted by the 
Taylor Company, was $307 million.97 
Similar to shareholder activism, commentators debate the utility of debtholder 
proactivity.98 Debtholder activism that identifies and replaces ineffective or fraudu-
lent management or helps management recognize the advantages of rightsizing the 
company’s operations through a restructuring may add value for the corporate entity. 
Debtholder activism that is pursued, however, solely for the economic interests of 
the activist may significantly undervalue the company or dismantle a company with 
other viable restructuring alternatives, provided that the company was given suffi-
cient time to restructure. These risks exist because a debtholder looking to buy the 
company wants to pay as little as possible, which frequently results in a low valuation 
that wipes out all junior creditors and shareholders.99 Likewise, a debtholder that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. See Debtors’ Motion for (I) an Order (A) Establishing Sale Procedures Relating to the 
Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors’ Assets; (B) Approving Bid Protections; (C) Estab-
lishing Procedures Relating to the Assumption and Assignment of Certain Executory Con-
tracts and Unexpired Leases, Including Notice of Proposed Cure Amounts; (D) Approving 
Form and Manner of Notice of All Procedures, Protections, Schedules, and Agreements; 
(E) Scheduling a Hearing to Consider the Proposed Sale; and (F) Granting Certain Related 
Relief; and (II) and Order (A) Approving the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors’ Assets 
and (B) Authorizing the Assumption and Assignment of Certain Executory Contracts and Un-
expired Leases in Connection With the Sale, In re Standard Register Company, No. 15-10541, 
(Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 12) Doc. No. 23, 2015 WL 1440853; see also Peg Brickley, Standard 
Register Files for Bankruptcy with Plans for Sale, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2015, 12:01 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/standard-register-files-for-bankruptcy-with-plans-for-sale-1426164844 
[https://perma.cc/X6JU-LD92]. 
 97. See Order (I) Authorizing the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors’ Assets Free 
and Clear of All Liens, Claims, Encumbrances, and Interests; (II) Authorizing the Assumption 
and Assignment of Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases; and (III) Granting 
Certain Related Relief, In re Standard Register Company, No. 15-10541-BLS, (Bankr. D. Del. 
June 19, 2015) Doc. No. 698; see also Randall Chase, Judge Set To OK Sale of Standard 
Register to Taylor Corp., SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (June 17, 2015), http://www.sandiegounion 
tribune.com/sdut-judge-set-to-ok-sale-of-standard-register-to-2015jun17-story.html [https://perma.cc 
/CY3L-YAVH]. 
 98. See, e.g., HILARY ROSENBERG, THE VULTURE INVESTORS (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
rev. ed. 2000) (1992); Bebchuk et al., supra note 72; Edith S. Hotchkiss & Robert M. 
Mooradian, Vulture Investors and the Market for Control of Distressed Firms, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 
401 (1997); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Fund Activism in the Enforcement of 
Bondholder Rights, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 281 (2009). 
 99. For example, an activist debtholder often will seek to purchase the company’s assets 
in a going concern bankruptcy sale by credit bidding the amount of its debt claim against the 
company. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (authorizing credit bidding by secured creditors). Unless the 
activist debtholder is also willing to pay cash in amount above its debt claim, the company 
will not have any cash or assets remaining after the sale to pay the claims of junior creditors 
or the interests of equity holders. 
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wants to own the company for strategic reasons (e.g., to prevent competition with 
another portfolio company or to capitalize on synergies with a certain aspect of the 
target company’s business) may not only undervalue the company, but also signifi-
cantly affect the company’s employee and vendor relationships. 
The following section details two different situations involving faltering compa-
nies and activist investors. These case studies illustrate the potential strengths and 
weaknesses of activism in this context. They also inform the proposal made in this 
Article to enhance the prospects of distressed companies and their stakeholders 
through targeted proxy access. 
C. Case Study: Darden Restaurants, Inc. 
Darden Restaurants, Inc. traces its origins to Bill Darden, who opened his first 
restaurant at the age of 19 in 1938.100 Since that time, the company has expanded and 
contracted and changed ownership several times. Activist investors have influenced 
at least some of these changes, particularly in recent years. 
Darden’s expansion started with the success of its Red Lobster restaurants in the 
1970s.101 In 1970, General Mills acquired the restaurant chain and, in 1982, intro-
duced The Olive Garden.102 General Mills spun off Darden in 1995, with Darden 
becoming an independent publicly traded company on the New York Stock 
Exchange.103 Although Darden is most commonly associated with Red Lobster and 
Olive Garden, Darden has owned (and in many instances continues to own) other 
well-known niche restaurants, including Bahama Breeze, LongHorn Steakhouse, 
Smokey Bones, The Capital Grille, and Yard House.104 
Darden’s first major financial disappointment occurred in 1997, when the com-
pany recorded an annual loss of $91.03 million and closed fifty-five stores.105 This 
                                                                                                                 
 
 100. Our History, DARDEN, http://www.darden.com/about/photo_history.asp [https:// 
web.archive.org/web/20150510060813/https://www.darden.com/about/photo_history.asp]. 
References to Darden before 1995 are to the business operations ultimately owned by Darden 
after the 1995 spin-off. As described below, Darden, Inc. was not formed until 1995. Id.; see 
also Gen. Mills Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Apr. 8, 1996) (“During the fiscal year 
ended May 28, 1995 the company spun off its restaurant operations as a separate, free-standing 
company, Darden Restaurants, Inc.”). 
 101. Red Lobster opened in the late 1960s, but it did not expand significantly in popularity 
and locations until the 1970s. See Darden Rest., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Aug. 16, 
1996) (charting the dramatic rise of Red Lobster in the 1970s, from 6 restaurants in 1970 to 
260 at the end of fiscal year 1980). 
 102. Id.  
 103. Our History, supra note 100; see Gen. Mills Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Apr. 
8, 1996). 
 104. Darden Rests., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 10 (Mar. 30, 2015); see Mark 
Chediak, Orlando-Based Darden Restaurants Sells Smokey Bones Chain to Private-Equity 
Firm, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Dec. 5, 2007), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2007-12-05 
/business/smokey05_1_smokey-bones-bones-barbeque-darden [https://perma.cc/3LZZ-D5ZR]; 
Our Brands, DARDEN RESTS., INC., https://www.darden.com/restaurants/our-brands 
[https://perma.cc/4A6J-3BJ7]. 
 105. Darden Rests., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 15 (Aug. 15, 1997) (noting in 
“Expansion Strategy” section that in fiscal year 1997, Darden closed thirty-nine Red Lobster 
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setback was, however, temporary, and Darden was able to remedy most of the prob-
lem through operational improvements at its Red Lobster and Olive Garden restau-
rants.106 The company then experienced a period of continuous growth and increased 
profits, with only minor interruptions, until late 2007.107  
After that time, Darden struggled to meet investors’ and management’s expecta-
tions. Operational adjustments, such as opening new “combo” locations featuring 
Red Lobster and Olive Garden, did not succeed,108 and expansion plans failed to 
boost revenues.109 Darden entered a particularly tumultuous period in late 2012 and 
2013.110 Darden reported a 37.6% drop in first-quarter profit in 2013 compared with 
                                                                                                                 
 
restaurants in the United States and Canada, and sixteen Olive Garden restaurants in the United 
States). 
 106. Darden Rests., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 5–6 (Sept. 25, 1998) (discussing in 
Exhibit 99 press release that there was  fifty percent growth in first quarter earnings and 
double-digit increases in comparable restaurant sales).  
 107. The company acquired and sold various assets during this period in the hopes of in-
creasing cash flows. See Rare Hospitality Sold to Orlando Company for $1.4 Billion, ATLANTA 
BUS. CHRON. (Aug. 16, 2007, 6:20 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/2007/08 
/13/daily41.html?page=all [https://web.archive.org/web/20131207223941/http://www.bizjournals.com 
/atlanta/stories/2007/08/13/daily41.html?page=all] (reporting that Darden had purchased Rare 
Hospitality, adding LongHorn Steakhouse and Capital Grille to Darden’s line of restaurants); 
see also Press Release, Darden Rests., Inc, Darden Restaurants Offers Barbecue Chain for 
Sale, Better Positioning Casual Dining Leader for Future Growth (May 5, 2007),  https:// 
s2.q4cdn.com/922937207/files/doc_news/news_2007/news_2007_general/DRI_News_2007_5_5
_General.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BBW-9H2B] (reporting that Darden elected to sell its Smokey 
Bones chain of barbecue restaurants “as part of an overall effort by the company to better 
position Darden for future growth”). 
 108. See Sandra Pedicini, Darden Restaurants Tests Combo Olive Garden/Red Lobster for 
Smaller Markets, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Jan. 24, 2011), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com 
/2011-01-24/business/os-hybrid-olive-garden-red-lobster-20110124_1_red-lobster-olive-garden 
-darden-restaurants [https://perma.cc/NK3B-4MC2] (reporting that Darden was pairing its 
two marquee brands in single-building locations in markets that could not support separate 
locations for the two); see also Darden Rests., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 1–2 (July 18, 
2014) (describing these locations as “synergy restaurants” housing a Red Lobster and Olive 
Garden in the same building and noting that of six “synergy restaurants,” two were closed in 
anticipation of the sale of Red Lobster and the remaining four would be converted into Olive 
Garden restaurants). 
 109. Darden also attempted to boost sales by adding two seafood chains to its lineup of 
specialty restaurants in 2012. See Alan Snel, Darden Buys Two Seafood Brands, NATION’S 
RESTAURANT NEWS (Oct. 13, 2011), http://nrn.com/archive/darden-buys-two-seafood-brands 
[https://perma.cc/MVQ7-UWZY] (reporting that Darden “acquired two small seafood chains, 
Eddie V’s Prime Seafood and Wildfish Seafood Grille, in a $59 million cash transaction”); see 
also Darden Rests., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 2 (July 18, 2014). 
 110. See Darden Rests., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 21 (July 18, 2014) (describing 
and anticipating the economic conditions that could interfere with performance). For example, 
on the same day in September 2013 that the company announced weak first-quarter earnings, 
the company also announced that it was cutting eighty-five jobs at its Orlando headquarters 
and the retirement of its second-in-command, COO Drew Madsen. Sandra Pedicini, Darden 
Restaurants Reducing 85 Corporate Positions; COO Drew Madsen Leaving, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL (Sept. 20, 2013), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2013-09-20/business/os-darden 
-layoffs-20130920_1_darden-restaurants-olive-garden-central-florida-restaurant-professor 
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that same period in the previous year.111 Although analysts had expected earnings of 
70–72 cents per share in the first-quarter of 2013, the actual mark was well below 
that at 53 cents per share.112 The company’s stock dropped 7% the day the news of 
the weak earnings and job cuts broke and closed at $45.78 per share.113 Notably, 
although Darden’s bigger name brands struggled in the first quarter of 2013, 
Darden’s specialty group out-performed them, showing a 0.5% rise in sales.114 This 
likely fueled activist investors’ later calls for big-brand spinoffs. 
In December 2013, Darden tried to calm investors’ unrest and calls for change with 
a restructuring plan aimed at increasing shareholder value.115 The major prongs of 
Darden’s plan included spinning off its Red Lobster brand and reducing new unit ex-
pansion.116 Darden was under continuing pressure from one of its shareholders, Baring-
ton Capital Group, to spin off its underperforming chains.117 News of the planned spin-
off and worse-than-expected earnings drove the stock price down by 5% to $50.17.118 
Shortly after the company’s announcement, another shareholder, Starboard 
Values LP, came out against the Red Lobster spin-off.119 Starboard owned 
approximately 6.2% of Darden’s stock at the time,120 and it had been lobbying 
Darden “to consider other options, such as splitting off its property as an independent 
real estate investment trust.”121 Darden ignored Starboard’s suggestions, even though 
                                                                                                                 
 
[https://perma.cc/93D5-KG6F]; see also Darden Rests., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 2 
(Sept. 20, 2013, 7:35:45 AM). 
 111. Pedicini, supra note 110; see also Darden Rests., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 
20 (Sept. 30, 2013).  
 112. Pedicini, supra note 110; see also Darden Rests., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 
20 (Sept. 30, 2013). 
 113. Pedicini, supra note 110.  
 114. Id.; Darden Rests., Inc., Exhibit 99 (Form 8-K) 1–2 (Sept. 20, 2013, 7:34:25 AM) 
(providing a press release on first-quarter sales from Darden’s specialty restaurants reporting 
“same-restaurant sales increases of 3.2% at The Capital Grille, 2.7% at Bahama Breeze, and 
2.1% at Eddie V’s, offset partially by declines of 4.4% at Seasons 52 and 1.5% at Yard 
House”). 
 115. See Press Release, Darden Rests., Inc., Darden Announces Comprehensive Plan To 
Enhance Shareholder Value, (Dec. 19, 2013), https://investor.darden.com/investors/press-releases 
/press-release-details/2013/Darden-Announces-Comprehensive-Plan-to-Enhance-Shareholder-Value 
/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/M4ER-9E45]; see also Darden Rests., Inc., Exhibit 99.1 (Form 
8-K) (Dec. 19, 2013, 9:54:42 AM). 
 116. See Darden Rests., Inc., Exhibit 99.2 (Form 8-K) 1 (Dec. 19, 2013, 7:10:12 AM). 
 117. See David Benoit, Darden’s Red Lobster Split Gets Messy Reaction, WALL ST. J.: 
MONEYBEAT (Dec. 19, 2013, 2:13 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/12/19/dardens 
-red-lobster-split-gets-messy-reaction/ [https://perma.cc/BN48-BYGA]. Barington also sug-
gested that Darden should spin off Olive Garden. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Samantha Sharf, Activists Turn Up Heat on Darden: Red Lobster Deal 
‘Unconscionable,’ Board ‘Misleading,’ FORBES (May 22, 2014, 11:30 AM), http://www.forbes 
.com/sites/samanthasharf/2014/05/22/activists-turn-up-heat-on-darden-red-lobster-deal 
-unconscionable-board-misleading/ [https://perma.cc/99PD-AS2R]; see also Darden Rests., 
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 14–15 (July 18, 2014). 
 120. See Sharf, supra note 119. 
 121. Nick Turner, Darden Activist Investor Starts Board Fight over Red Lobster, 
BLOOMBERG (May 22, 2014, 4:12 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-22 
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Barington ultimately supported Starboard’s request for a shareholder vote on the 
proposed spin-off.122 Darden spun off Red Lobster without a shareholder meeting or 
vote.123 Starboard ultimately pursued and won a proxy battle to take over Darden’s 
board by nominating a slate of directors to replace all twelve members.124  
To support its proxy contest, Starboard produced a 294-slide presentation that 
walked shareholders through Darden’s missteps, both financial and operational, and 
offered concrete solutions to improve the company’s performance.125 For example, 
two slides, titled “Breadsticks: just one example of food waste,” explained how Olive 
Garden’s practice of serving its unlimited breadsticks in excessive quantities beyond 
the customers’ requests or needs reduced margins and profitability.126 Another slide 
then suggested the consequences: 
                                                                                                                 
 
/darden-investor-starboard-starts-proxy-battle-over-red-lobster.html [https://perma.cc/2QV2 
-L8ED]. Starboard asserted that Darden was selling Red Lobster for just $100 million more 
than the value of the chain’s real estate, which could be sold tax-free. Darden disagreed with 
Starboard’s analysis, asserting that the proposed sale would generate about $1.6 billion in 
proceeds. Darden planned to use $1 billion of the proceeds to retire debt and the remainder to 
fund a share buyback program of as much as $700 million. See Sharf, supra note 119; see also 
Darden Rests., Inc., Exhibit 99.2 (Form DEFA14A) (Sept. 16, 2014, 4:48:53 PM) (providing 
a presentation discussing Starboard’s proposal). 
 122. See Press Release, Barington Capital Grp., L.P., Barington Group Sends Letter to the 
Independent Directors of Darden Restaurants, (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.prnewswire.com 
/news-releases/barington-group-sends-letter-to-the-independent-directors-of-darden-restaurants 
-252430861.html [https://perma.cc/278R-S6AL]. 
 123. See Press Release, Darden Rests., Inc., Darden Completes Sale of Red Lobster to 
Golden Gate Capital, (July 28, 2014), https://investor.darden.com/investors/press-releases 
/press-release-details/2014/Darden-Completes-Sale-Of-Red-Lobster-To-Golden-Gate-Capital 
/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/AN4Q-BAVM]; see also Darden Rests., Inc., Current Report 
(Form 8-K/A) (Aug. 1, 2014). In the midst of finalizing the sale, Darden announced that 
Clarence Otis was stepping down as chairman and would only serve as CEO of Darden “until 
the earlier of the appointment of his successor or December 31, 2014.” Press Release, Darden 
Rests., Inc., Darden Announces Leadership Succession Plan (July 28, 2014), https://investor 
.darden.com/investors/press-releases/press-release-details/2014/Darden-Announces-Leadership 
-Succession-Plan/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/MGC7-G3CN]; see also Darden Rest., Inc., 
Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 29, 2014). This announcement appeared to be a move to try 
to appease shareholders prior to the annual shareholders’ meeting. 
 124. See Turner, supra note 121; see also Darden Rests., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 
(Oct. 16, 2014). 
 125. Press Release, Starboard Value LP, Starboard Releases Detailed Transformation Plan 
for Darden Restaurants (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases 
/starboard-releases-detailed-transformation-plan-for-darden-restaurants-274867301.html [https:// 
perma.cc/JS9Z-MT8M]; Starboard Value LP, Transforming Darden Restaurants (Sept. 11, 
2014) [hereinafter Starboard Value, Transforming Darden], http://www.shareholderforum 
.com/dri/Library/20140911_Starboard-presentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/LR5G-EARX]. 
Starboard compiled a similar presentation to contest Darden’s decision to sell Red Lobster. 
See Starboard Value LP, Investor Presentation, Darden Restaurants, Inc. (Mar. 31, 2014) 
[hereinafter Starboard Value, Investor Presentation], http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar 
/data/940944/000092189514000699/ex991dfan14a06297125_033114.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/U248-LPN2]. 
 126. Starboard Value, Investor Presentation, supra note 125, at 104–05. 
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Despite having far more stores than any of its peers, Darden does not 
show economies of scale in food costs. In fact, Darden’s food costs are 
near the highest in the industry. . . . We believe the primary driver of 
Darden’s food cost problem is poor execution and discipline around food 
waste, portion size, and preparation.127 
Starboard ended the slide presentation with a summary of “Why Darden is compel-
ling,” Starboard’s priorities, and its plan for the company.128  
Although Darden reported losses for the second quarter of fiscal year 2015 (i.e., 
the first quarter following the board’s replacement),129 it has consistently 
outperformed since.130 Darden reported improved revenue and sales for the third and 
fourth quarters131 and was identified as one of the “hottest dividend stocks of 2015.”132  
D. Case Study: RadioShack Corp. 
Similar to Darden, RadioShack has a long history dating back to 1921, when it 
opened as a small shop in Boston.133 The company initially focused on radios, ex-
panding to other audio equipment in the 1950s and then to electronic calculators and 
computers in the 1970s.134 RadioShack experienced financial distress early in its 
lifecycle; in fact, the company was on the verge of bankruptcy when Tandy 
                                                                                                                 
 
 127. Id. at 102 (emphasis omitted). 
 128. Id. at 286. 
 129. Darden Rests., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 26 (Dec. 31, 2014) (announcing 
second quarter results for fiscal year 2015). 
 130. See, e.g., Press Release, Darden Rests., Inc., Darden Restaurants Reports Fiscal 2017 
First Quarter Results; Increases Earnings Outlook for the Full Fiscal Year; and Announces 
New Share Repurchase Authorization (Oct. 4, 2016), https://investor.darden.com/investors 
/press-releases/press-release-details/2016/Darden-Restaurants-Reports-Fiscal-2017-First-Quarter 
-Results-Increases-Earnings-Outlook-For-The-Full-Fiscal-Year-And-Announces-New-Share 
-Repurchase-Authorization/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/J32Y-VPKY] (“‘I’m pleased with 
our performance during the quarter and the progress we made against our strategic initiatives,’ 
said CEO Gene Lee. ‘We continued to gain market share and our same-restaurant sales growth 
outperformed the industry by a considerable margin. We also returned significant capital to 
shareholders in the form of our regular dividend and $196 million in share repurchases.’”). 
 131. Darden Rests., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 25 (Mar. 30, 2015); Darden Rests., 
Inc., Exhibit 99.1 (Form 8-K) 1 (June 23, 2015, 7:03:43 AM) (announcing fourth-quarter re-
sults in press release attached as Exhibit 99.1). 
 132. Dominic Chu, The Hottest Dividend Stocks of 2015, CNBC (Mar. 24, 2015, 2:58 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/03/24/the-hottest-dividend-stocks-of-2015.html [https://perma.cc 
/DA4W-6UXU].  
 133. See, e.g., Joshua Brustein, Inside RadioShack’s Slow-Motion Collapse, BLOOMBERG 
(Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-02-02/inside-radioshack 
-s-slow-motion-collapse [https://perma.cc/866M-WGCG]; RadioShack Corporation, 
REFERENCE FOR BUS., http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/history2/8/RadioShack-Corporation.html 
[https://perma.cc/3HWL-9WS9]. 
 134. See Brustein, supra note 133; Alan Wolf, RadioShack: A Brief History of Time, TWICE 
(Feb. 16, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.twice.com/news/retail/radioshack-brief-history-time 
/56040 [https://perma.cc/7LJW-WLM5]. 
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Corp. purchased it in 1963.135 Tandy was able to turn around the company by 
branding it as a “hobby store”—a place where you could purchase whatever you 
needed to build the latest gadget.136 The strategy was successful, and the company 
grew from 100 stores in 1966 to over 1000 stores by 1971.137 It also started generating 
a profit just two years after the Tandy acquisition.138 
For most of the 1970s and 1980s, RadioShack was the store for everything elec-
tronic. It was able to stay ahead of the curve and capture the market on new innova-
tions such as the the CB radio, the personal computer, and the cellular phone.139 
RadioShack began to falter, however, in the 1990s, and it never really regained its 
footing. 
RadioShack’s management tried altering the company’s offerings and business 
model to improve the company’s overall performance. By the late 1990s, 
RadioShack stopped manufacturing personal computers and cellular phones, and it 
began opening big-box type retail stores that each specialized in certain electronic 
products.140 The concept stores experiment failed, and each was shuttered or sold by 
the end of the 1990s.141  
RadioShack’s permanent decline began in 2005, with significant management 
turnover and increasing diminution in value. From 2005 to 2014, the company 
experienced six changes at the CEO position, and its shares lost almost all of their 
value.142 The company also experienced eleven consecutive quarters of losses before 
                                                                                                                 
 
 135. See Brustein, supra note 133 Tandy was a leather company, which was trying to di-
versify in the 1960s. Tandy ultimately exited the leather industry in 1975 and focused on the 
electronics side of the business. Tandy was publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange, 
and it changed its name to RadioShack in 2000, then trading under the symbol RSH. See A 
Brief History of RadioShack, RADIOSHACKCATALOGS.COM, http://www.radioshackcatalogs.com 
/history.html [https://perma.cc/3B2D-KABS].  
 136. See Brustein, supra note 133. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See RadioShack Corporation History, FUNDINGUNIVERSE http://www.fundinguniverse 
.com/company-histories/radioshack-corporation-history/ [https://perma.cc/9XTP-VPEP]. See 
generally Peter W. Barnes, Tandy’s Shifting Sales Strategy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 1984), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/08/19/business/tandy-s-shifting-sales-strategy.html?pagewanted 
=all [https://perma.cc/DR93-UTN3] (“In 1963 Mr. Tandy acquired nine ailing Radio Shack 
stores, and in 20 years he catapulted them into an international chain of nearly 9,000 outlets.”); 
Steven Davidoff Solomon, A History of Misses for RadioShack, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept. 
16, 2014, 2:35 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/for-radioshack-a-history-of-misses 
/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/CM2L-CKV8] (describing RadioShack’s various failures). 
 139. See Brustein, supra note 133; Davidoff Solomon, supra note 138. 
 140. See Brustein, supra note 133; Davidoff Solomon, supra note 138; see also Tandy 
Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 30, 1994) (discussing various stores in Item 1 and 
divestiture of computer manufacturing businesses and cellphone manufacturing business in 
sections on “Discontinued Operations” and “Sale of Joint Venture Interest”). 
 141. See Davidoff Solomon, supra note 138; see also Tandy Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 
10-Q) 5 n.6 (May 12, 2000) (titled 1996 Business Restructuring). 
 142. See Brustein, supra note 133; Anne D’Innocenzio & Michelle Chapman, RadioShack 
Stock Closes Below $1 per Share, HONOLULU STAR ADVERTISER (June 20, 2014), http://www 
.staradvertiser.com/breaking-news/radioshack-stock-closes-below-1-per-share/ [https://perma.cc 
/E222-BLYC] (“RadioShack’s stock closed below $1 per share Friday for the first time in its 
history, reflecting investors’ concern over what lies in store for the long-struggling consumer 
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filing for bankruptcy in early 2015.143 Notably, RadioShack did not file for bank-
ruptcy quietly—it tried vigorously to avoid it.144 The question becomes whether 
those efforts and the prebankruptcy actions of its lenders helped or ultimately hurt 
the company and its shareholders. 
As RadioShack struggled to rebrand itself in 2012 and 2013, it secured a financing 
package of $835 million to refinance its existing debt and provide additional li-
quidity.145 The package consisted of a $585 million secured credit facility provided 
by a group of lenders led by GE Capital and a $250 million term loan provided by 
Salus Capital Partners, LLC.146 Both loans contained a number of restrictive cove-
nants, including one that limited the number of stores that RadioShack could close 
in any fiscal year.147 This particular covenant would prove problematic. 
RadioShack’s restructuring plan in 2014 included streamlining its operations and 
closing approximately 1100 underperforming stores.148 Unfortunately, the term loan 
permitted RadioShack to close only 200 stores per year, with 600 store closings over 
                                                                                                                 
 
electronics chain.”); Jason Mick, Life in These Batteries? What RadioShack’s History Tells 
Us About Its Survival Bid, DAILYTECH (Feb. 11, 2015, 12:24 AM), http:// 
www.dailytech.com/Life+in+These+Batteries++What+RadioShacks+History+Tells+us+About+Its 
+Survival+Bid/article37133.htm [https://perma.cc/VY67-WGMQ]; Barry Schlachter, At 
RadioShack, a History of Hits and Missed Chances, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 4, 2014), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/business/at-radioshack-a-history-of-hits-and-missed-chances/ 
[https://perma.cc/6VLT-LYLN] (“Sales have dropped 33 percent since 2005, when it recorded 
net profits of $267 million, compared with last year’s loss of $400 million.”). 
 143. See, e.g., Rebecca R. Ruiz & Michael J. de la Merced, RadioShack Files for Chapter 
11 Bankruptcy After a Deal with Sprint, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 5, 2015, 5:47 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/radio-shack-files-for-chapter-11-bankrutpcy/?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/8DAJ-4PNW]. The losses also are documented in RadioShack’s public fil-
ings for the period beginning in April 2012 and ending with the bankruptcy filing. See, e.g., 
RadioShack Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Apr. 24, 2012); RadioShack Corp., 
Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (July 25, 2012); RadioShack Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 
10-Q) 3 (Dec. 11, 2014) (reporting net loss of $161.1 million for the quarter ending on 
November 1, 2014, compared to net loss of $135.9 million for the quarter ending on October 
31, 2013); RadioShack Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Feb. 11, 2015) (announcing filing 
of Chapter 11). 
 144. RadioShack Corp., Exhibit 99.1 (Form 8-K) (Sept. 11, 2014) (providing a press re-
lease titled “RadioShack Reports Second Quarter Financial Results,” discussing restructuring 
efforts). 
 145. RadioShack Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) 2 (Dec. 13, 2013) (announcing 
financing). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at Exhibit 10.1, 66 (sec. 5.2(d) of credit agreement between RadioShack and 
General Electric Capital); id. at Exhibit 10.3, 43 (sec. 5.2(d) of credit agreement between 
RadioShack and Salus Capital Partners, LLC). 
 148. See, e.g., Motion of Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for an Order, Pursuant 
to Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Rule 2004, and Local Bankruptcy Rule 
2004-1, Authorizing and Directing the Examination of the Debtors and Certain Third Parties 
at 8, In re RadioShack Corp., No. 15-10197(BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 17, 2015) [hereinafter 
Committee Rule 2004 Motion]; Elizabeth A. Harris, RadioShack Pulls Back on Size of Store 
Closings, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/business 
/radioshack-pulls-back-on-size-of-store-closings.html [https://perma.cc/H8N5-D242]. 
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the life of the loan agreement.149 Salus and Cerberus denied RadioShack’s numerous 
requests for a waiver of the restriction without certain fees, terms, and conditions, 
which RadioShack found unacceptable (and expensive).150 As one commentator ob-
served, “[T]his is also a bit of a game of chicken—if the banks play hardball too 
much. RadioShack may end up being forced to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which 
will leave the banks fighting over the scraps.”151 
Shortly thereafter, RadioShack began exploring financing and restructuring alter-
natives with one of its shareholders, Standard General L.P. Standard General pro-
vided the following description of these discussions in its September 2014 Schedule 
13D filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission: 
Standard General has been in discussions with the Company regard-
ing a proposal on a business operating plan and certain ways to improve 
the Company’s liquidity position in advance of the holiday shopping sea-
son. Proposals under discussion include Standard General and certain 
other investors (the “New Investors”) purchasing loans and other com-
mitments under the Company’s asset backed credit facility (the “Credit 
Facility”) from its existing lenders. Under such a proposed transaction, 
Standard General and certain other New Investors may propose to sub-
ordinate their investment in the Credit Facility to other investors in order 
to improve the near-term liquidity available to fund the Company’s holi-
day working capital needs. Pursuant to such a proposal, the investment 
by the New Investors could be the first step of a broader recapitalization 
of RadioShack proposed to be completed by early 2015, which may in-
clude Standard General and certain other New Investors acquiring pre-
ferred equity convertible into common equity, board nomination rights 
and corresponding changes to the Company’s structure.152 
Standard General’s Schedule 13D also revealed that it owned 9.8% of RadioShack’s 
common stock, with related entities owning additional shares and with it having op-
tions to purchase three million additional shares.153 
Standard General and a group of investors purchased RadioShack’s $535 million 
credit facility from GE Capital and immediately amended the facility to provide the 
company with additional liquidity.154 The investors also entered into a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 149. Harris, supra note 148. 
 150. See RadioShack Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 8, 2014); see also 
Committee Rule 2004 Motion, supra note 148, at 12 (“In connection with the October 2014 
Transaction, RadioShack incurred $31.8 million in financing fees as well as approximately 
$142 million in additional obligations,
 
despite the fact that the company had suffered losses in 
the previous 11 quarters.” (citation omitted)). 
 151. See Harris, supra note 148 (quoting Anthony Chukumba of BB&T Capital Markets). 
 152. Standard Gen. L.P., Schedule 13D (Form SC 13D) (Sept. 26, 2014). 
 153. Id. 
 154. See Press Release, RadioShack Corp., RadioShack Announces Milestone in 
Recapitalization Process (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases 
/radioshack-announces-milestone-in-recapitalization-process-278065871.html [https://perma.cc 
/WG3Y-T4WN]; see also RadioShack Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) 2 (Oct. 7, 2014) 
(describing purchase of credit facility and amendments to that facility). Notably, the loans 
were purchased by General Retail Holdings L.P. (GRH) and General Retail Funding LLC 
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Recapitalization and Investment Agreement, under which the investors would con-
vert their debt into a substantial percentage of RadioShack’s equity if certain condi-
tions were met.155 This additional liquidity infusion allowed RadioShack to operate 
through the 2014 winter holiday season, but it did not solve RadioShack’s underlying 
operational and financial problems. RadioShack also failed to satisfy the conditions 
of the Recapitalization and Investment Agreement.156 
Accordingly, RadioShack filed for bankruptcy in February 2015.157 The bank-
ruptcy filing was premised on a prenegotiated sale of the entire company to Standard 
General and other investors through a credit bid of the prebankruptcy debt held by 
those investors.158 The bankruptcy case took several different twists and turns, but 
Standard General ultimately was the successful bidder for substantially all of 
RadioShack’s assets.159 The sale generated little value for the majority of the 
company’s prebankruptcy creditors and shareholders.160 For purposes of this Article, 
                                                                                                                 
 
(GRF), each an affiliate of Standard General. Moreover, other investors were partners or 
members of GRH and GRF. See Declaration of Carlin Adrianopoli in Support of First Day 
Pleadings at 7, In re RadioShack Corp., No. 15-10197(KJC) (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 5. 2015) 
[hereinafter Adrianopoli Declaration]. 
 155. See RadioShack Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-3) (Dec. 12, 2014) (describ-
ing terms of the rights offering to RadioShack’s “legacy shareholders” (i.e., existing share-
holders other than the investor group) and the issuance of convertible preferred stock to 
Standard General and others in the investor group that would be convertible into 20–50% of 
the company’s common stock in exchange for debt cancellation if certain conditions were 
met). 
 156. See Adrianopoli Declaration, supra note 154, at 14. 
 157. Id. at 2. 
 158. See Debtors’ Combined Motion for Entry of Orders: (I) Establishing Bidding and Sale 
Procedures; (II) Approving the Sale of Assets; and (III) Granting Related Relief, In re 
RadioShack Corp., No. 15-10197 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 5, 2015). “General Wireless [i.e., 
Standard General] was the stalking-horse bidder for the stores with a bid valued at $145.5 
million, comprised of $117.5 million in the form of a credit bid of the credit agreement loans, 
$18.6 million in cash, and $9.4 million in assumed liabilities.” Alan Zimmerman, Bankruptcy: 
RadioShack Asset Sale to Standard General Nets Court OK, FORBES (Mar. 31, 2015, 
6:31 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/spleverage/2015/03/31/bankruptcy-radioshack-asset-sale 
-to-standard-general-nets-court-ok/ [https://perma.cc/UNN7-TLD6]. Standard General’s cre-
dit bid was reduced to approximately $112 million based on a dispute with RadioShack’s other 
prepetition lender, Salus. Id. For an example of the various allegations asserted against 
Standard General and others involved in RadioShack’s prebankruptcy restructuring efforts, 
see Committee Rule 2004 Motion, supra note 148, at 23–30. 
 159. See Order Authorizing (I) the Sale of Certain Assets of the Debtors Free and Clear of 
All Claims, Liens, Liabilities, Rights, Interests and Encumbrances; (II) the Debtors To Enter 
into and Perform Their Obligations Under the Asset Purchase Agreement and Certain 
Ancillary Agreements; (III) the Debtors To Assume and Assign Certain Executory Contracts 
and Unexpired Leases; and (IV) Granting Related Relief, In re RadioShack Corp., No. 15-
10197(BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 1, 2015); see also Zimmerman, supra note 158 (explaining, 
among other things, that Standard General’s winning bid also included an agreement with 
Sprint for a small cash infusion and a commitment to a “store within a store” concept going 
forward). 
 160. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 158 (“Despite all the [turmoil] associated with the 
competition for the RadioShack assets, at the end of the day it would appear to mean little for 
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it is important to note that although some of the company’s stores continue to operate 
in a modified form under the new ownership,161 Standard General was the primary 
beneficiary of the sale. The corporate entity was not restructured in any meaningful 
way that benefited its long-term sustainability or the interests of its prebankruptcy 
shareholders, creditors, employees, and other stakeholders. 
E. Takeaways from the Case Studies 
The Darden and RadioShack case studies illustrate two very different approaches 
to activism. Some commentators may find both approaches troublesome, and some 
may view them as equally valuable. Undeniably, both activists were pursuing strate-
gies that each believed to be in their own respective best interests; acknowledging 
the self-interest and general motivation to increase the investor’s own return on in-
vestment, which are present in all activism, facilitates a more meaningful analysis. 
Starboard approached Darden as an owner, offering critiques of management and 
operations that it believed were depressing the company’s overall value.162 Starboard 
not only criticized, but it also offered potential management and operational solu-
tions. It disseminated its analysis and additional information to all of the company’s 
shareholders. Starboard did not extract any fees or value that would not also be re-
ceived proportionally by all of the company’s shareholders. Although Starboard’s 
slate of directors now runs the company, those directors were vetted with and voted 
on by Darden’s shareholders.163 Darden also is continuing to operate on a much 
stronger platform, with improved performance and likely returns to shareholders.164  
Standard General, on the other hand, first approached RadioShack as a share-
holder, but with a plan to own the company’s debt—indeed, a secured position at the 
most senior level of the company’s debt structure.165 Standard General does not ap-
pear to have offered any operational or restructuring expertise to the company, and 
it did not facilitate the dissemination of information to other shareholders. Rather, 
Standard General appears to have situated itself in a position in which it would win 
regardless of whether the company restructured or not. In addition, at least based on 
allegations in the bankruptcy case, some investors participating in Standard 
General’s prebankruptcy extension of credit to the company also sold credit default 
swaps on RadioShack that would have become payable if RadioShack defaulted prior 
to January 2015.166 Consequently, Standard General held multiple positions 
throughout RadioShack’s capital structure and was focused more on capturing 
                                                                                                                 
 
the company’s creditors, most of whom were destined to see a minimal, if any, recovery re-
gardless of who was declared the winner.”). 
 161. At the time of its bankruptcy filing, RadioShack had 4400 company-operated stores, 
1100 dealer-franchised outlets, and 21,000 full- and part-time employees. Adrianopoli 
Declaration, supra note 154, at 3. Reports indicate that Standard General will maintain ap-
proximately 1723 of those operating locations. See Zimmerman, supra note 158. 
 162. See supra Part II.C. 
 163. See supra text accompanying note 124. 
 164. See supra text accompanying note 131. 
 165. See supra Part II.D. 
 166. See supra note 158. 
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returns—arguably to the exclusion of all others—through a takeover of the company 
as opposed to an operational or financial restructuring. 
Notably, each of the above investment strategies is well known and used by vari-
ous entities in the industry.167 This Article does not challenge the validity or propriety 
of either strategy. The Article does suggest, however, that one form of activism may 
hold greater value for the corporate entity itself and for more of the corporation’s 
stakeholders. The challenge is identifying means to encourage a more Darden-like 
approach to distressed companies, recognizing that not all such efforts will prove 
successful and that all activism has the potential to reallocate value against the inter-
ests of a majority of the company’s stakeholders. The following Part considers the 
various alternative activist strategies and draws on the case studies to develop and 
propose the targeted proxy access bylaw—a tool that would utilize the discipline and 
expertise often present in activism and enhance value for the corporate entity and 
more of its stakeholders. 
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION: PROXY ACCESS WHEN A COMPANY NEEDS IT MOST 
Conventional wisdom posits that debt disciplines management.168 Debt financing 
subjects management to, among other things, conduct covenants, financial and per-
formance metrics, and active oversight by lenders. In theory, such provisions should 
encourage responsible management and reduce agency costs. In reality, debt financ-
ing can cause management to take excessive risks, limit the company’s future opera-
tional and restructuring alternatives, and make the company vulnerable to takeover 
bids by distressed debt investors.169  Accordingly, conventional wisdom may not hold 
true in every case. A company approaching or facing financial distress may need an 
appropriate dose of shareholder activism to discipline management and preserve value. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 167. See supra Part II.A–B. In addition, a Darden-like approach is not always successful. 
See, e.g., William Alden, Michael J. de la Merced & Jennifer Daniel, The Activist Investor 
Scorecard, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/12 
/11/business/dealbook/the-activist-investors-of-wall-street.html [https://perma.cc/C8H3-QQWS]; 
Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Ackman Turns Back on J.C. Penney, Sells Entire Stake in Retailer, 
REUTERS (Aug. 27, 2013, 12:39 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/27/us-jcpenney 
-ackman-idUSBRE97P0TA20130827 [https://perma.cc/WB6Z-KHZ5]. 
 168. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, in 
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 314, 321–23 (John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Louis Lowenstein & Susan Rose-Ackerman eds., 1988) (describing the free 
cash flow theory and attributes of debt that discipline management). 
 169. As a company incurs more debt to try to prolong its life and fix the financial or opera-
tional problems, directors may be more aggressive on the premise that the company and share-
holders have nothing to lose. Such conduct, however, can damage any remaining value at the 
company. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 
340 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining dilemma faced by directors of distressed companies and basis 
for theory of deepening insolvency); see also U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Stanley, 297 S.W.3d 
815, 822 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) (citing, where creditor brought action arguing that board ap-
proved excessive spending, expert report opining that “that despite numerous ‘red flags,’ the 
directors ‘were in total support of the business strategy of “swinging for the fences” in order 
to try to pay off the Senior Preferred Stock and return control of [TransTexas] to 
Stanley’”(alteration in original)). 
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That said, not every kind of shareholder activism is value enhancing.170 The ac-
tivism needs to fit the problem. In the context of financial distress, the tool should 
encourage management to acknowledge the company’s issues in a timely manner, to 
explore all options, and to be open to new approaches and perspectives. It also should 
strive to enhance management’s leverage in negotiations with creditors and other 
stakeholders. All too often, management of a financially distressed company has 
waited too long to address the issues underlying the company’s distress, has bor-
rowed more money to buy additional time, and, as a result, ends up negotiating the 
end deal with lenders with little or no bargaining power.171 As explained below, the 
targeted proxy access bylaw is designed to incentivize management to proactively 
manage operational and financial distress and to provide shareholders with access to 
the ballot when management fails in those efforts.  
This Part provides a brief history of proxy access rules and regulations, and dis-
cusses the current state of proxy access initiatives. It explores the basic parameters 
of proxy access proposals and reviews the ongoing debate concerning the utility of 
proxy access. It then explains the targeted proxy access proposal in greater detail, 
identifying key elements of such a bylaw, proposed language, and potential imple-
mentation issues. It concludes by suggesting the tailored nature of the targeted proxy 
access proposal better addresses potential governance inefficiencies than more gen-
eral proxy access initiatives. 
A. An Overview of Proxy Access  
The Darden case study illustrates how activist shareholders can use a proxy con-
test to effect change.172 The typical proxy contest involves an activist shareholder, 
who likely owns more than five percent of the company’s stock and has made re-
quired disclosures under section 13D of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (the 
“Exchange Act”).173 The activist shareholder will initiate (or continue) conversations 
with management to glean knowledge and begin outreach to other shareholders on 
an informal basis.174 The activist shareholder is careful not to trip the solicitation 
rules of the Exchange Act until it is ready to begin filing materials with the SEC.175 
Solicitations may begin prior to the filing of the proxy statement, but the activist 
                                                                                                                 
 
 170. See supra text accompanying notes 83–84. 
 171. See supra text accompanying notes 83–84; see also supra Part II.B.  
 172. See supra Part II.C. 
 173. See 15 U.S.C.A § 78m(d) (West 2015) (codifying section 13D of the Exchange Act); 
17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2015). The rules also require a shareholder who files a Schedule 13D 
to update the filing as the shareholder’s holdings and objectives change. See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13d-2 (2015). 
 174. For an example of the start of a typical activist campaign, see David Benoit & Jacob 
Bunge, Nelson Peltz Launches Proxy Fight Against DuPont, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2015, 9:07 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nelson-peltz-launches-proxy-fight-against-dupont-1420761264 
[https://perma.cc/F39S-9ZHN]. 
 175. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to -3 (2015) (defining solicitation and establishing general 
solicitation rules); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (2015) (setting forth the filing and pre-clearance 
process for proxy statements).  
2016] TARGETED PROXY ACCESS  261 
 
shareholder must file any written materials used in the solicitation with the SEC.176 
These additional solicitation materials may contain significantly more information 
than the proxy statement, as disagreements between the company and the activist 
shareholder often play out more visibly in “fight letters” and other communications 
with shareholders that, under the rules, are filed with, but not precleared by, the SEC.177 
An activist shareholder pursuing a proxy contest may put forth a full or partial 
slate of directors to challenge the company’s proposed slate.178 The activist share-
holder’s proxy materials and proxy card are sent separately from those of the com-
pany. In the typical proxy contest, each side bears its own costs, and the contest can 
be quite expensive.179 DuPont Chemical reportedly spent $15 million to defeat a 
proxy contest launched by an activist shareholder, Trian Fund Management.180 
Although some data suggest that proxy contests create value regardless of the out-
come, proxy contests are rare and may not facilitate a change in the board.181  
Not only are proxy contests expensive, they also are often quite ugly.182 A proxy 
contest is by definition adversarial. The company’s directors do not want the activist 
shareholder’s nominee(s) on the board, and they likely disagree with the facts and 
arguments asserted by the activist shareholder to support the proxy contest. There 
are no predetermined grounds for a valid or useful proxy contest. The activist share-
holder’s objectives may be bona fide and in the best interests of the company; they 
                                                                                                                 
 
 176. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-12 (2015) (allowing certain kinds of solicitations prior to the 
filing of the proxy statement). 
 177. See John C. Wilcox, Shareholder Nominations of Corporate Directors: Unintended 
Consequences and the Case for Reform of the U.S. Proxy System, in SHAREHOLDER ACCESS 
TO THE CORPORATE BALLOT (Lucian Bebchuk ed., forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 3), http:// 
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/corp_gov/proxy-access-roundtable-09-materials/Wilcox,John 
_Shareholder%20Nominations%20of%20Corporate%20Directors.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2N7-5M3C] 
(explaining tools often used by activist shareholders in intense proxy contests). 
 178. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(2) (2015) (setting forth proxy requirements). 
 179. See Michael J. Goldberg, Democracy in the Private Sector: The Rights of 
Shareholders and Union Members, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 393, 409 (2015) (“The high cost of 
proxy fights have made them rare, and this is exacerbated by free rider problems, and rational 
apathy on the part of shareholders with easy exit available through the Wall Street Rule.”). 
 180. See Jeff Mordock, DuPont Spent $15M To Keep Activist Investor off Board, USA 
TODAY (May 19, 2015, 11:18 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015 
/05/19/dupont-spent-15m-proxy-fight/27575179/ [https://perma.cc/THK5-TLVX]. 
 181. See DONALD M. DEPAMPHILIS, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND OTHER RESTRUCTURING 
ACTIVITIES 100 (8th ed. 2015) (citing studies and finding that “[d]espite a low success rate, 
proxy fights often result in positive abnormal returns to target shareholders regardless of the 
outcome”); see also Christopher Takeshi Napier, Resurrecting Rule 14a-11: A Renewed Call 
for Federal Proxy Access Reform, Justifications and Suggest Revisions, 67 RUTGERS U. L. 
REV. 843, 867–69 (2015) (reviewing studies assessing value of shareholder contests and sug-
gesting more recent studies indicate value creation). 
 182. The public opinion campaign that often accompanies a proxy battle can reach far and 
wide. See, e.g., Stephen Gandel, DuPont Activist Battle Spreads from Wall Street to Academia, 
FORTUNE, (Apr. 21, 2015, 9:18 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/04/21/dupont-activist-battle 
-spreads-from-wall-street-to-academia/ [https://perma.cc/6ZAC-BAZW] (describing the pub-
lic exchanges and accusations between the activist shareholder engaged in a proxy fight with 
DuPont and a Yale University professor).  
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also may be purely self-motivated and based on agenda adverse to other stake-
holders.183 Regardless of the objective, the fight that ensues can be very disruptive 
for the company and its ongoing operations and should not be undertaken lightly. 
Proxy access, which generally allows qualifying shareholders to nominate a cer-
tain percentage of the board through the company’s proxy materials, does not elimi-
nate the adversarial nature of the process. The simple act of a shareholder putting 
forth its own nominee suggests a lack of confidence in the current board and directly 
challenges the board’s management of the company. In most cases, the board likely 
will oppose the shareholder nominees, and that effort still requires time and money 
that otherwise could be devoted to the company’s operations. Nevertheless, proxy 
access can cabin the dispute and mitigate some of the costs associated with a proxy 
contest. 
Proxy access initiatives are not new,184 but they garnered increased attention after 
Congress passed the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd Frank Act”).185 The Dodd Frank Act authorized the SEC to adopt proxy 
access rules,186 and the SEC was quick to pass a rule—Rule 14a-11—that required 
                                                                                                                 
 
 183. See, e.g., Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. 9469–VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *7–10 
(Del. Ch. May 2, 2014) (reviewing exchanges between the company’s chair, president, and 
CEO (William Ruprecht) and the activist investor (Third Point) in the contest of a challenged 
shareholder rights plan, and quoting Ruprecht as saying, “The motivation for that [proxy] fight 
is only peripherally about returning capital. It is about being on Sotheby’s Board. Mick 
McGuire needs that as validation, and Loeb wants that for ego.”); Joe Nocera, Investor Exits 
and Leaves Puzzlement, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/30 
/business/30nocera.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/XYA8-79EW] (noting that 
activist investor William Ackman “had begun the proxy fight [at Target] not because he had a 
$1 billion-plus investment in Target shares that was seriously underwater—not at all!—but 
because ‘we never want Target to be referred to as a “once-great company”’”). 
 184. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 16, at 330 (“The ability of shareholders to 
place director nominees on the company’s proxy materials is an issue that the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) has been considering for over sixty years.”); Jill E. Fisch, 
The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J. 435, 440–47 (2012) (de-
scribing history of proxy access). 
 185. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301). There is 
a rich literature on proxy access generally, including under the Dodd Frank Act and the SEC’s 
proposed Rule 14a-11. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Streamlining Access to the Corporate 
Ballot, CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, March/April 2004, at 28 (2004); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
The Case for Shareholder Access: A Response to the Business Roundtable, 55 CASE WESTERN 
RES. L. REV. 557 (2005); Joseph A. Grundfest, Advice and Consent: An Alternative 
Mechanism for Shareholder Participation in the Nomination and Election of Corporate 
Directors, in SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE CORPORATE BALLOT (Lucian Bebchuk, ed., 
forthcoming 2004), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dir-nominations/grundfest032004.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9ZC2-BFPG]; Brett H. McDonnell, Setting Optimal Rules for Shareholder 
Proxy Access, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 67 (2011); Mark J. Roe, The Corporate Shareholder’s Vote 
and Its Political Economy, in Delaware and Washington, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Comment on the SEC Shareholder Access Proposal (Univ. of Cal., 
L.A. Sch. of Law Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 03-22, 2003), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=470121; see also supra notes 16 and 17. 
 186. See § 971, 124 Stat. at 1915 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2012)) 
(authorizing the SEC to adopt rules that, among other things, include “a requirement that a 
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public companies to include shareholder nominees in their proxy materials.187 The 
legislation and the resulting rule were grounded in general concerns regarding the 
lack of board accountability during the 2008 financial crisis and a belief by some that 
proxy access could mitigate that problem.188 Rule 14a-11 was short-lived, however, 
as it was successfully challenged in court.189 The SEC has not taken any further ac-
tion on a definitive proxy access rule. 
In connection with Rule 14a-11, the SEC also passed an amendment to Rule 14a-
8 that authorized the use of shareholder proposals to initiate changes to the board 
nomination process. As the SEC explained:  
[W]e are amending Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to preclude companies from relying 
on Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to exclude from their proxy materials shareholder 
proposals by qualifying shareholders that seek to establish a procedure 
under a company’s governing documents for the inclusion of one or more 
shareholder director nominees in the company’s proxy materials.190 
Under the shareholder proposal rules, a company must include the shareholder 
proposal in its proxy materials unless the company has grounds to exclude it.191 
                                                                                                                 
 
solicitation of proxy, consent, or authorization by (or on behalf of) an issuer include a nominee 
submitted by a shareholder to serve on the board of directors of the issuer”). 
 187. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,668 
(Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 CFR pts. 200, 232, 240, 249) (“The new rules will re-
quire . . . a company’s proxy materials to provide shareholders with information about, and 
the ability to vote for, a shareholder’s, or group of shareholders’, nominees for director”); 
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11, invalidated by Business Roundtable v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 647 
F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 188. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate 
Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1795–97 (2011) (discussing factors leading to 
passage of certain federal legislation, including the Dodd-Frank Act); Rachelle Younglai, 
Shareholders Win More Rights To Influence Boards, REUTERS (Aug. 25, 2010, 1:32 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec-proxyaccess-idUSTRE67M54420100825 [https://perma.cc 
/49CU-DR5W] (describing justifications for and arguments against Rule 14a-11 and quoting 
SEC Chair Mary Schapiro, “As a matter of fairness and accountability, long-term significant 
shareholders should have a means of nominating candidates to the boards of the companies 
that they own.”). 
 189. See Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1156. 
 190. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Release Nos. 33-9136, 34-62764, 75 
Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,677 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249). 
 191. Companies have tried to exclude proxy access proposals under Rule 14a-8(i)(9) (di-
rect conflict; SEC took no position on this exclusion during 2015 proxy season), Rule 14a-
8(i)(10) (substantial implementation), and Rule 14a-8(i)(11) (duplication), as well as Rules 
14a-8(i)(7) (ordinary business) and 14a-8(i)(3) (contrary to rule), with varying degrees of suc-
cess. See, e.g., Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2015) (dis-
cussing exclusions under Rules 14a-8(i)(7) and 14a-8(i)(3)); SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT 
LLP, supra note 9, at 3–8 (reviewing grounds for excluding proxy access proposals); Elizabeth 
A. Ising & Kasey L. Robinson, Recent Developments Related to the SEC’s Shareholder 
Proposal Rule, BUS. L. TODAY, July 2015, at 1 (discussing exclusion of proxy access proposals 
and Third Circuit’s Wal-Mart decision). 
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Shareholders then vote on any shareholder proposals included in the company’s 
proxy materials at the annual meeting. 
Shareholders were slow to embrace the shareholder proposal alternative for gain-
ing access to the company’s proxy materials.192 They are, however, using it more 
frequently, with varying degrees of success. The most common proxy access bylaw: 
(i) requires a shareholder to own a certain percentage of stock (e.g., three percent), 
(ii) requires the shareholder to have owned the stock for a continuous period of time 
(e.g., three years), (iii) limits the number of nominees that a shareholder may submit 
(e.g., twenty percent of the board), and (iv) may limit the number of shareholders 
that can act collectively as a group.193  
Companies have responded in different ways to shareholder proposals concerning 
proxy access. Some have opposed the proposal, some have supported the proposal 
or reached a settlement with the shareholder, and some have tried to preempt the 
shareholder proposal by adopting a board-proposed proxy access bylaw.194 Regard-
less of approach, many companies appear concerned by, and skeptical of, proxy ac-
cess bylaws.195 
B. The Targeted Proxy Access Proposal 
The current approach to proxy access is an all-or-nothing proposition.196 Share-
holders either have the ability to nominate directors in the company’s proxy materials 
or they do not. But such an approach misses a valuable opportunity to tailor proxy 
access proposals to situations that objectively could benefit the company and strike 
a more appropriate balance between management autonomy and accountability. 
A targeted proxy access bylaw would allow the board to manage the company, 
free of challenges through proxy access, so long as management of the company was 
well in hand. The board of a company that is profitable and stable—even if some 
shareholders believed the company could be doing even better—would not face a 
challenge through proxy access.197 Notably, activist shareholders could still launch 
                                                                                                                 
 
 192. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. For examples of the literature supporting 
proxy access, see supra note 16. 
 193. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 194. For example, during the 2015 proxy season, seventy-eight companies included a 
shareholder proposal on proxy access with an opposition statement; sixteen companies volun-
tarily adopted proxy access; six companies negotiated resolutions; seven companies included 
both a shareholder and a company proposal; two companies supported the shareholder pro-
posal; and one company provided no board recommendation. SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT 
LLP, supra note 9, at 14–15. 
 195. For an example of the literature opposing or raising concerns with proxy access, see 
supra note 17. 
 196. As noted in Part I and discussed further below, the SEC proposed contingent proxy 
access in 2003. The target access proposal discussed in this Article, however, differs in signifi-
cant ways from the prior SEC proposal. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text; see 
also Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Release Nos. 33-9136, 34-62764, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 56,668, 56,677 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249). 
 197. This approach mitigates concerns regarding conflicting interests among a diverse and 
very dispersed shareholder body, as well as potential short-term objectives of the activist in-
vestor. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
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campaigns against management, but they would not have the benefit of the com-
pany’s proxy materials.198 To that end, a targeted proxy access bylaw may deter some 
campaigns prior to the targeted proxy access trigger. It also may color shareholders’ 
perspectives of activist campaigns launched prior to a triggering event: Are such ef-
forts for the primary benefit of the activist, or the company and larger shareholder body? 
A targeted proxy access bylaw also could have a prophylactic effect by encour-
aging executives to manage difficult operational and financial situations more pro-
actively.199 Although management rarely intends to make decisions that worsen the 
company’s performance or deepen the company’s financial distress, directors and 
managers often are overly optimistic about their decision-making skills and will take 
that chance.200 Directors and managers may, however, consider a broader range of 
options to mitigate potential distress, knowing the consequences if they are too slow 
or too limited in their approach. Likewise, to the extent management tries and fails, 
the targeted proxy access bylaw would introduce a new perspective and arguably 
change the tenor of the discussions earlier in the process. Shareholders no longer 
would have to wait or launch expensive standalone proxy contests to help manage-
ment implement a turnaround plan. The triggers, if appropriately crafted, would al-
low more timely intervention.201 
The terms of the targeted proxy access bylaw are key to its effectiveness. A board 
or shareholder proposing such a bylaw needs to consider not only the factors identi-
fied above in the context of a more general proxy access bylaw, but also the triggers 
that would grant the targeted proxy access to shareholders.202 Although each com-
pany should tailor its bylaw to its particular situation and industry, a proponent of 
the bylaw should consider the following: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 198. For example, activist shareholders may launch a proxy campaign to encourage boards 
to distribute value to shareholders though dividends or share buy-back plans. See supra note 
75 and accompanying text.  
 199. In this respect, targeted proxy access is a form of “offensive” activism. See, e.g., Paul 
Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in Corporate 
Governance, 2014 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1015 (2014) (discussing potential value to offensive activ-
ism, including in the context of proxy access); Cheffins & Armour, supra note 72, at 58–61 
(distinguishing between offensive and defensive forms of shareholder activism). 
 200. Conflicts of interest may skew management’s incentives to make good decisions. In 
addition, hubris also may impede decision-making. For a discussion of conflicts and cognitive 
biases impacting board decisions, see supra Part I.B. 
 201. As discussed supra in Part I.B, a board may have “ostrich syndrome” with respect to 
the company’s financial or operational distress. A board that ignores or delays addressing the 
company’s financial or operational issues potentially impairs the company’s ability to re-
structure effectively and subjects the company to significant outside influence from 
debtholders. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. 
 202. For examples of general proxy access bylaws, see GEN. ELEC. CO., BY-LAWS 7–10 (as 
last amended and restated on Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.ge.com/sites/default/files 
/GE_by_laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/XL3T-S6JC]; WHOLE FOODS MKT., INC., AMENDED AND 
RESTATED BYLAWS 12–19 (effective June 26, 2015), http://assets.wholefoodsmarket.com 
/www/company-info/investor-relations/corporate-governance/20150630-Whole-Foods-Market 
-Inc-Amended-and-Restated-Bylaws_6_26_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3T3G-GVEN]. 
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 Triggers. Use triggers that are objective and easy to identify. Triggers could 
include a material default under a credit facility or bond issuance; a restructur-
ing, refinancing, or forbearance to avoid a material default under a credit fa-
cility or bond issuance; a downgrade by one of the major ratings agencies; or 
a certain number of consecutive quarters of significant losses (or misses on 
other significant financial metrics). The concepts of “material definitive agree-
ment” and “direct financial obligation” under the SEC’s Form 8-K, Current 
Report, could guide the kinds of agreements subject to the triggers.203 A dis-
closure required by Form 8-K, Item 2.04, Triggering Events that Accelerate or 
Increase a Direct Financial Obligation, could also serve as a trigger.204 In the 
case of RadioShack, the company experienced a loss of $139 million, sus-
pended dividend payments to shareholders, and was downgraded by the ratings 
agencies in 2012–2013.205 Any one (or all) of these events could have triggered 
a targeted proxy access bylaw. In that instance, one or more shareholder nomi-
nees could have been seated prior to the company signing its subsequent fi-
nancing agreements. The triggers should be designed to give the existing board 
an opportunity to fix an identified problem, but not prolong and thereby exac-
erbate the problem. A board proposed bylaw would allow the board to establish 
reasonable parameters while recognizing some accountability if it fails. For 
example, a target proxy bylaw could provide: 
Upon the occurrence of a Trigger Event, the Company shall include in 
its proxy statement for [any subsequent annual or special]206 meeting of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 203. See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 23. The SEC’s release concerning the 2004 
amendments to Form 8-K explains that, in Item 101, the term “material definitive agreements” 
has the meaning used in Item 601(b)(10) of Regulation S-K. See Additional Form 8-K 
Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, Release Nos. 33-8400, 34-49424, 
69 Fed. Reg. 15,594, 15,596 (Mar. 25, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, et al.) 
[hereinafter SEC Release Nos. 33-8400, 34-49424]. Item 601(b)(10) includes “[e]very contract 
not made in the ordinary course of business which is material to the registrant and is to be 
performed in whole or in part at or after the filing of the registration statement or report or was 
entered into not more than two years before such filing,” as well as certain significant contracts 
“as ordinarily accompanies the kind of business conducted by the registrant.” 17 C.F.R. 
§ 229.601(b)(10) (2016). Moreover, the SEC’s 2004 release also explained that Item 2.03 “re-
quires disclosure of the following information if the company becomes obligated under a direct 
financial obligation that is material to the company.” SEC Release Nos. 33-8400, 34-49424, 
supra note 203, at 15,598. These terms are further explained in the Instructions included in 
Form 8-K. See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 23. 
 204. See SEC Release Nos. 33-8400, 34-49424, supra note 203, at 15,599–15,600. 
 205. See Drew Fitzgerald, Emily Glazer & Dana Mattioli., RadioShack Gets Loan from GE 
Capital, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2013, 6:19 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles 
/SB10001424052702303902404579149800844793012 [https://perma.cc/W35D-ZGUC]. 
 206. This language is bracketed for two reasons. First, companies and shareholders could 
specifically define the duration of proxy access. For example, the bylaw could provide that 
“Upon the occurrence of a Trigger Event, the Company shall include in its proxy statement 
for the immediate four annual meetings . . . .” Such a durational restriction would “reload” the 
proxy access after the expiration of the trigger on the theory that the board used the more direct 
shareholder intervention for a period of time to assist the turnaround and then continues unless 
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shareholders, the name of any person timely207 nominated for election 
(each a “Shareholder Nominee”) to the Board of Directors by an indi-
vidual Eligible Shareholder or a group of up to [twenty] Eligible 
Shareholders. [If the Company’s next annual meeting is more than 
ninety days following the Trigger Event, the Company’s board of direc-
tors shall notice a special meeting of shareholders for a date not more 
than sixty days following the Trigger Event for purposes of implementing 
this provision.]208 The Company also shall include the Required 
Information209 in any such proxy statement containing the names of any 
Shareholder Nominee. 
The term “Trigger Event” means (i) a material default or event of de-
fault under the Company’s credit agreements, bond indentures, or other 
material financing agreements [or could use “material definitive agree-
ments”] that is not cured within the grace period provided by the 
                                                                                                                 
 
and until another triggering event. Second, timing matters in distressed situations. Depending 
on the kinds of triggers, the bylaw could contemplate a special meeting of shareholders within, 
for example, sixty days of the trigger event to facilitate more timely intervention. See, e.g., 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d) (2011) (“Special meetings of the stockholders may be called 
by the board of directors or by such person or persons as may be authorized by the certificate 
of incorporation or by the bylaws.”). Trigger events designed to identify distress as early as 
possible may not need such accelerated proxy access. 
 207. The timeliness of the submission is important. Many proxy access proposals use a 
timeframe similar to advance notice bylaws: 
[N]ot more than one hundred fifty (150) calendar days and not less than one hun-
dred twenty (120) calendar days prior to the anniversary date of the date (as 
specified in the Corporation’s proxy materials for its immediately preceding an-
nual meeting of shareholders) on which the Corporation first mailed its proxy 
materials for its immediately preceding annual meeting of shareholders. 
WHOLE FOODS MKT., INC., supra note 202, at 13. Notably, shorter time periods may be war-
ranted in the targeted proxy access context, where elections should take place shortly after the 
trigger event. For example, a thirty-day submission period may work well with a special meet-
ing of shareholders called on sixty days’ notice. 
 208. See supra note 206 (discussing timing concerns with the implementation of targeted 
proxy access and the potential use of special meetings to address these concerns). 
 209. The term “Required Information” should include the Shareholder Information, 
Nominee Information, and Shareholder Position Statement described below. The following is 
an example of a definition for Required Information: 
“Required Information” that the Corporation will include in its proxy statement 
is the information provided to the Secretary concerning the Shareholder 
Nominee(s) and the Eligible Shareholder that is required to be disclosed in the 
Corporation’s proxy statement by Section 14 of the Exchange Act, and the rules 
and regulations promulgated thereunder, and, if the Eligible Shareholder so 
elects, a written statement, not to exceed 500 words, in support of the Shareholder 
Nominee(s)’ candidacy (the “Statement”). Notwithstanding anything to the con-
trary contained in this Article II, Section 15, the Corporation may omit from its 
proxy materials any information or Statement (or portion thereof) that it, in good 
faith, believes would violate any applicable law or regulation . . . . 
WHOLE FOODS MKT., INC., supra note 202, at 14. 
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applicable agreement;210 (ii) the Company’s entry into a refinancing 
agreement, restructuring agreement, forbearance agreement, or similar 
agreement to avoid or resolve a material default or event of default un-
der the Company’s credit agreements, bond indentures, or other mate-
rial financing agreements [or could use “material definitive agree-
ments”]; (iii) a downgrade of the Company’s debt obligations of two or 
more ratings within a consecutive twelve month period by one of the 
major ratings agencies; or (iv) the Company sustaining net losses, as 
reflected on its income statement, for four or more consecutive 
quarters.211 
 Alternative Proposal on Timing and Nomination Process. The value of tar-
geted proxy access stems largely from its potential to assist companies in iden-
tifying and remedying financial and operational distress in its early stages. In-
deed, a company that lingers in distress too long may have no viable 
restructuring options. In such a scenario, the shareholders arguably have little 
or no interest in the company; in other words, they have missed their oppor-
tunity to add value to the going concern.212 As such, the vesting of the right to 
board representation needs to occur in a timely manner; waiting too long to 
grant shareholders this right could significantly limit the provision’s utility. 
Likewise, the right arguably should lapse after a period of unresolved distress. 
Accordingly, proponents of targeted proxy access may consider a provision 
similar to that often granted holders of preferred stock—namely, the right to 
designate two additional directors to the board in a relatively short period of 
time following the trigger event.213 Such a provision could provide: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 210. A board and shareholders should identify triggers that work best for the company’s 
business and capital structure and provide sufficient early warnings to allow meaningful inter-
vention in the company’s turnaround. Simply referencing the term “material definitive agree-
ment” may cover all necessary agreements. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 211. A board and shareholders may want to use additional or alternative triggers. Such 
triggers could focus on Items 2.03 and 2.04 of Form 8-K, or even the company receiving a 
going concern qualification from its auditors. A company likely would not want to rely solely 
on the going concern qualification because, depending on the industry and the nature of the 
company’s operations, such trigger may or may not provide sufficient early warnings of the 
company’s distress. 
 212. Commentators debate the value of shareholders’ interests in a company as that com-
pany approaches insolvency. As explained at Part I, Delaware courts have determined that 
near-insolvency does not change the focus of directors’ duties. See, e.g., supra note 40. Nev-
ertheless, incentives shift as a company approaches insolvency, and shareholders may be will-
ing to take on significantly greater risk than advisable at that point in the company’s lifecycle. 
In fact, the shareholders’ perspective could become value destructive, rather than value en-
hancing. For this reason, a company may want to include a safety valve in its targeted proxy 
access provision that “shuts off” the access after a certain period of time in distress or upon 
certain objective financial benchmarks. A company and its stakeholders also could at that point 
mandate the appointment of a chief restructuring officer, or the addition of a restructuring 
expert or creditor representative to the board, to better represent all interests in what likely will 
be a liquidation or sale event. 
 213. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 25, at 
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Upon the occurrence of a Trigger Event, the Company’s shareholders 
shall have the right to elect two additional directors to the Company’s 
board of directors (“Special Voting Right”).214 The Company shall in-
clude in its proxy statement for any subsequent annual or special meet-
ing of shareholders, the name of any person timely215 nominated for elec-
tion (each a “Shareholder Nominee”) to the Board of Directors 
pursuant to the Special Voting Right by an individual Eligible 
Shareholder or a group of up to [twenty] Eligible Shareholders. If the 
Company’s next annual meeting is more than ninety days following the 
Trigger Event, the Company’s board of directors shall notice a special 
meeting of shareholders for a date not more than sixty days following 
the Trigger Event for purposes of implementing this provision.216 The 
Company also shall include the Required Information217 in any such 
proxy statement containing the names of any Shareholder Nominee. The 
Special Voting Right shall terminate on a date that is [three] years fol-
lowing the Trigger Event (the “Termination Date”) and the term of the 
directors then serving pursuant to the Special Voting Right shall end 
immediately prior to the Company’s next regularly scheduled annual 
meeting of shareholders. 
 Shareholder Eligibility and the Relevance of the Holding Period. Include per-
centage ownership and holding period requirements that align the interests of 
the shareholder nominating directors with the company; limit the number of 
nominees that may be submitted by shareholders and included in the com-
pany’s proxy materials; and permit, with reasonable limits, participation by 
groups to allow a more diverse representation of shareholders to participate. 
These requirements are very similar to the basic provisions included in general 
proxy access bylaws.218 Nevertheless, proponents of targeted proxy access 
may want to ease the eligibility requirements—including the mandated holding 
period—given the urgency of the issues presented by the Trigger Event. For 
example, a three-year holding period may impede an activist investor’s ability 
                                                                                                                 
 
§ 313.00(C) (setting forth minimum voting rights of preferred stockholders in listed 
companies, including the right to elect two directors to the board “upon default of the 
equivalent of six quarterly dividends”).  
 214. Proponents of this kind of targeted proxy access certainly could enlarge the number 
or percentage of additional directors that are elected pursuant to the provision. The mere pres-
ence of two dissenting or alternative voices may, however, prove sufficient in many cases. 
This kind of provision may require an amendment to the company’s bylaws or certificate to 
enlarge the board as necessary to accommodate the additional directors. See, e.g., DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2011). Proponents also may want to include language that prohibits the 
Company from otherwise enlarging or altering the number of directors on the board while the 
provision is in effect. 
 215. See supra note 207 (discussing the timeliness of submissions). 
 216. See supra note 206 (discussing timing concerns with the implementation of targeted 
proxy access and the potential use of special meetings to address these concerns). 
 217. See supra note 209 (discussing an example of these disclosures). 
 218. See supra notes 193, 201 and accompanying text. 
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to use targeted proxy access to the benefit of the company.219 Thus, even com-
panies with a general proxy access provision may want to provide enhanced 
access rights in the particular circumstances defined by the Trigger Event. The 
facts and circumstances of the company’s distress may, on balance, outweigh 
any short-termism concerns and tilt in favor of a shorter holding period 
requirement. 
 Shareholder Disclosures. Require detailed disclosures by the shareholder 
nominating directors. These disclosures should include not only information 
about its beneficial holdings in the company, but also any related derivative 
products, debt, or other interests it may hold, directly or indirectly, in the com-
pany. To supplement the disclosures required in Schedule 14N,220 companies 
and the SEC may want to consider a definition of “economic interest” similar 
to the following definition of “disclosable economic interest” under Rule 2019 
of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure: “any claim, interest, pledge, 
lien, option, participation, derivative instrument, or any other right or deriva-
tive right granting the holder an economic interest that is affected by the value, 
acquisition, or disposition of a claim or interest.”221 Understanding the eco-
nomic interests of the nominating shareholder and its potential agenda are par-
ticularly important in the distressed context, as evidenced by the RadioShack 
case study.222  
 Nominee Disclosures. Require specific disclosures concerning the nominee, 
including all relevant information that is provided by the company with respect to 
its nominees.223 Notably, the trigger allowing proxy access may help shareholders 
identify nominees offering skills relevant to the particular issues plaguing the 
company. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 219. See Sharfman, supra note 17, at 410–11. 
 220. See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14n-101 (2016). Schedule 14N and many proxy access by-
laws focus on disclosures concerning the nominating shareholder’s ownership in securities 
entitled to vote, and whether any such securities have been loaned or are subject to a short 
sale. Although this information is helpful, it does not necessarily provide the complete picture 
of the nominating shareholder’s interest in the election. For thoughtful articles regarding the 
issues posed by conflicting and undisclosed ownership positions, see Roberta S. Karmel, 
Voting Power Without Responsibility or Risk: How Should Proxy Reform Address the 
Decoupling of Economic and Voting Rights?, 55 VILL. L. REV. 93 (2010); Usha Rodrigues, 
Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from Ownership, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 1822 (2011). 
 221. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019. The author is the associate reporter to the Advisory 
Committee on the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, but she was not serving in such 
capacity when Federal Rule 2019 was amended to include the definition of disclosable 
economic interest in 2011. See also Harner, supra note 67 (suggesting that the SEC amend 
Schedule 13D and the related rules to require disclosure of information concerning debt, as 
well as equity securities). 
 222. See supra Part II.D. 
 223. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14n-101. 
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 Shareholder Position Statement. Define the scope (and word count) of the 
statement in support that the nominating shareholder may include in the proxy 
materials.224 This may be one of the trickier aspects of a targeted or general 
proxy access proposal because the information should explain why the share-
holder believes a new approach is necessary. Disseminating this competing 
perspective is important and valuable in the distressed context. Nevertheless, 
it may also be unpalatable to the board. A company should permit statements—
even those adverse to, or critical of, management—provided they are grounded 
in facts supported by public documents and do not otherwise violate applica-
ble law.225 
The Darden case study illustrates the importance of both timely intervention and 
the dissemination of information to all shareholders.226 Notably, companies and 
shareholders can benefit from these attributes of proxy access whether the company 
proposes a targeted proxy access bylaw or already has adopted a more general proxy 
access bylaw. Strategic and thoughtful use of proxy access—only when and as nec-
essary—is an important consideration in assessing the value of shareholder interven-
tion. The factors identified in this section with respect to targeted proxy access also 
can and should guide shareholders in using general proxy access to help companies 
in operational or financial distress. A key benefit to a targeted proxy access bylaw, 
however, is that it focuses the use of proxy access on instances that more objectively 
warrant intervention.227 
C. Potential Challenges to Targeted Proxy Access 
Notwithstanding the suggested benefits to targeted proxy access, implementation 
may encounter resistance. For example, boards may oppose such a bylaw because it 
still impedes on autonomy and, unlike general proxy access, suggests that the board 
may fail at some point in the future. Likewise, shareholders may not believe the pro-
posal goes far enough. And as with any new initiative, there are costs to being among 
the first to adopt the proposal, including risks associated with the untested 
                                                                                                                 
 
 224. Many proxy access bylaws limit nominating shareholder statements to 500 words. 
See, e.g., GEN. ELEC. CO., supra note 202, at 9; WHOLE FOODS MKT., INC., supra note 202, 
at 14. 
 225. For example, General Electric’s proxy access bylaw provides: 
The Eligible Shareholder may provide to the Secretary, within the time period 
specified in Article VII Section D for providing notice of a nomination, a written 
statement for inclusion in the Company’s proxy statement for the meeting, not to 
exceed 500 words, in support of the Shareholder Nominee’s candidacy (the 
Statement). Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Arti-
cle VII, the Company may omit from its proxy materials any information or 
Statement that it believes would violate any applicable law, rule, regulation or 
listing standard. 
GEN. ELEC. CO., supra note 202, at 9. 
 226. See supra Part II.C. 
 227. See supra notes 201–06 and accompanying text (discussing competing considerations 
and balance struck by targeted proxy access). 
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effectiveness of the concept and increases in the cost of credit. This subpart briefly 
addresses the potential concerns of each side to this debate. 
Proxy access (whether targeted or general) can subject management to increased 
scrutiny and challenge. General proxy access introduces the possibility that manage-
ment will devote time and money defending its position and warding off proxy access 
contests on an annual basis.228 Under the timeline used in many proxy access bylaws, 
that could consume three to four months out of every year.229 That is a significant 
period of time during which management may be distracted by things arguably ex-
ternal to the core operations of the business. Although hopefully shareholders would 
be more selective and thoughtful in invoking proxy access rights, the concern has 
merit. 
A targeted proxy access bylaw would mitigate this concern by defining the situa-
tions in which proxy access will be available. It would not be an annual contest. It 
also would be somewhat in the control of the board to manage. A board may not 
always be able to anticipate events causing operational or financial distress, but it 
does often have red flags warning of potential problems.230 A targeted proxy access 
bylaw may encourage boards to more readily see and address such red flags. That 
said, the trigger of the targeted proxy access bylaw as the company is facing a dis-
tressed situation arguably could be more disruptive than in other circumstances. For 
this reason, the balance discussed above in defining the triggers is critical. 
A shareholder likewise may oppose targeted proxy access in favor of a more gen-
eral approach that would give shareholders access in any annual election.231 This 
perspective is understandable, given that shareholders cannot predict in advance 
when they would like to intervene more directly in management’s decisions. Activist 
shareholders do not limit their campaigns to distressed situations. Rather, they often 
seek changes at companies that otherwise are profitable and stable.232 Notably, the 
targeted proxy access bylaw would not prevent them from pursuing those campaigns. 
It would, however, limit their ability to use the company’s proxy materials to situa-
tions defined in the bylaw triggers. 
These potential concerns are not new. In fact, some were raised with respect to 
the SEC’s 2003 contingent proxy access proposal, which would have given share-
holders the ability to nominate directors under certain circumstances unrelated to a 
company’s financial health, as well as during its consideration of Rule 14a-11.233 
Supporters of triggers believed “that such a requirement would serve as a useful in-
dicator of the companies with demonstrated governance issues.”234 Those who 
                                                                                                                 
 
 228. See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text (discussing opposition to general 
proxy access). 
 229. See supra notes 202, 207 (providing example of language used in advance notice and 
general proxy access bylaws). 
 230. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text (discussing management’s delay in 
addressing distress and harmful effects for company). 
 231. See supra notes 8, 16, 197 and accompanying text (discussing arguments of propo-
nents of general proxy access). 
 232. See supra Parts II.A, II.B (discussing various objectives of activist campaigns). 
 233. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Release Nos. 33-9136, 34-62764, 75 
Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,680–81 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249). 
 234. Id. at 56,681. 
2016] TARGETED PROXY ACCESS  273 
 
opposed triggers expressed “concern that triggering events would cause significant 
delays and introduce undue complexity into the rule.”235 The SEC ultimately elected 
not to include triggers in Rule 14a-11 because, among other things, it suggested that 
a limited federal proxy rule might not give full effect to shareholders’ state law 
rights.236 
The advantages and disadvantages to targeted proxy access noted in the context 
of the SEC’s rulemaking process are generally valid points. The question in many 
ways becomes what are the objectives of federal proxy rules and how can they best 
protect shareholders’ rights. Shareholders should have the ability to exercise their 
state law rights to vote on directors. Should they also have the ability, however, to 
nominate directors in all cases?237 Part of the related challenge is the diverse and 
often very dispersed nature of public company shareholders, as well as the fact that 
shareholders generally owe no fiduciary duties to the company or other share-
holders.238 A company, and arguably even applicable law, better protect the interests 
of all shareholders if the designated fiduciaries (i.e., boards) have the ability to nomi-
nate directors, subject to appropriate safeguards in situations where boards fail in 
their duties. 
Targeted proxy access strikes that balance, pursuing a path in the first instance 
that allows the company’s fiduciaries to nominate directors and operate the business 
in the best interests of the company and all shareholders. Individual shareholders 
who potentially have competing interests or adverse agendas do not initially have 
those rights, but the board knows those shareholders may gain such rights in certain 
circumstances. As one proponent of triggers suggests, “‘triggered’ proxy access 
would give shareholders an avenue for dealing with unresponsive boards, but protect 
companies from the threat of a proxy access challenge in the absence of a serious 
governance or strategic matter.”239  
Interestingly, neither side necessarily wins by adopting a targeted proxy access 
bylaw, but each side has the potential to succeed in the long run. A board may also 
proactively adopt a targeted proxy access bylaw to signal strength and confidence to 
the market, backstopped by the shareholders’ proxy access as defined in the bylaw 
triggers.240 Although no board likes to admit the potential for failure, it is a reality of 
doing business. Targeted proxy access allows a board to define the parameters of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. For a thoughtful exploration of shareholders’ rights under state law and how the right 
to vote and the right to nominate interact, see Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Director Nominations, 
39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 117 (2014). 
 238. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 
1987) (“Under Delaware law a shareholder owes a fiduciary duty only if it owns a majority 
interest in or exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation.”). 
 239. Shirley Westcott, Another Busy Year Ahead for Proxy Access, THE ADVISOR, Jan. 
2016, at 1, 4, http://allianceadvisorsllc.com/newsletters/another-busy-year-ahead-for-proxy-access 
-jan-2016/ [https://perma.cc/K2TD-UQ8G] (describing position of the United Brotherhood of 
Carpenters Pension Fund). 
 240. Ratings agencies could consider whether companies have adopted targeted proxy ac-
cess as an appropriate oversight mechanism to protect the company’s financial health in rating 
a company’s debt. 
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accountability tool and thereby eliminate the need for a more general proxy access 
bylaw. 
Finally, boards may anticipate lenders increasing the cost of credit if the company 
adopts a board- or shareholder-proposed targeted proxy access bylaw. This concern, 
although understandable, does not withstand scrutiny, provided that the bylaw is 
adopted prior to any operational or financial distress. Lenders extending credit to a 
financially healthy company likely would view such a bylaw as a neutral or positive 
attribute.241 To the extent the bylaw is appropriately designed, the bylaw also should 
protect the lenders’ investment and strengthen the company’s ability to repay the 
debt upon maturity. A distressed debt investor looking to take over the company 
through a bankruptcy or out-of-court restructuring may not approve of a targeted 
proxy access bylaw, but such investors often have a different agenda or assessment 
of the company’s risk profile.242 A distressed debt investor may view targeted proxy 
access as a potential impediment to a rescue loan or refinancing structure that pro-
tects the investor on the downside through significant lender control provisions. No-
tably, this is exactly the kind of leverage the proposal seeks in part to mitigate. 
As with any proposal, the effectiveness of targeted proxy access lies in the details 
of each company’s bylaw. The underlying objectives of incentivizing proactive man-
agement of financial or operational distress and increasing accountability for related 
failures should guide the development of the proposal. Moreover, these objectives 
and the balanced approached offered by targeted proxy access make it a useful tool 
for both boards and shareholders interested in the long-term success of the company. 
CONCLUSION 
Boards make hard decisions. They are called upon to vet various opportunities 
and alternatives for their companies and, in the process, must determine the best way 
forward. Although directors’ fiduciary duties flow to the corporate entity and, in most 
situations, shareholders, directors’ decisions affect numerous other individuals and 
entities.243 The voices and interests of these other parties can make even simple de-
cisions noisy and complex, and may influence directors’ deliberations. 
Noise and complexity grow as a company’s profitability shrinks. Boards of dis-
tressed companies face competing demands from creditors, shareholders, and em-
ployees. The decisions at hand are of the “bet the company” nature, and the stakes 
are extremely high. Moreover, the directors’ fiduciary duties typically remain un-
changed, but the company’s senior debtholders may be the only parties at the nego-
tiating table.244 Boards, their companies, and their shareholders would benefit from 
activism that balances leverage and also helps boards make better decisions. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 241. See Jayanthi Sunder, Shyam V. Sunder & Wan Wongsunwai, Debtholder Responses 
to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from Hedge Fund Interventions, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 3318 
(2014) (“We compare loan spreads before and after intervention and show the effects of het-
erogeneous shareholder actions. Spreads increase when shareholder activism relies on the mar-
ket for corporate control or financial restructuring. In contrast, spreads decrease when activists 
address managerial entrenchment.”). 
 242. See supra Part II.B. 
 243. See supra Part I.B. 
 244. See generally supra Parts I.B, II.B. 
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The targeted proxy access bylaw would do exactly that.245 The proposal would 
channel shareholder activism to situations in most need of intervention. It would al-
low qualifying shareholders to nominate a certain percentage of the board, thereby 
introducing new perspectives and potentially targeted expertise to the board. Im-
portantly, the urgency of the company’s situation when a targeted proxy access pro-
vision is triggered may warrant more lenient shareholder eligibility requirements, 
thereby more readily introducing the shareholders’ perspective into distressed situa-
tions. Targeted proxy access also would facilitate the dissemination of additional in-
formation to shareholders—information that may counter management’s story and 
challenge the status quo. Unlike a more general proxy access bylaw, however, direc-
tors would not be open to proxy access contests on an annual basis and would face 
such contests only if they fail to navigate any operational or financial distress in a 
timely manner.246  
Although any proxy access can facilitate needed intervention in times of distress, 
a targeted proxy access bylaw strikes a better balance. It gives a board the autonomy 
necessary to run a company effectively, but provides a safety valve for shareholders 
in the event the board fails. Overall, such a bylaw offers a reasonable compromise to 
the proxy access debate and has the potential to help companies and shareholders 
preserve value in distressed situations. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 245. See supra Part III.B. 
 246. See supra Part III.B. 
